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DESIGNING DUAL-CLASS SUNSETS: THE CASE
FOR A TRANSFER-CENTERED APPROACH
MARC T. MOORE*
ABSTRACT
Dual-class stock (DCS) structures, and their implications for
managerial accountability and corporate governance more broadly,
have become prevalent concerns for corporate lawyers and policymakers. Recent academic and practitioner debates on DCS have
tended to focus less on the general merits and drawbacks of DCS
versus one share/one vote structures, and more on the specific
common-ground concern as to whether and how such structures
are subjected to contingent reversal or “sunset”. This Article compares the relative advantages and disadvantages of time-, ownership- and transfer-centered models of DCS sunset provisions. It
argues in favor of the transfer-centered model on the grounds that:
(a) its specific event-based trigger renders it less arbitrary in application than the time-centered model, and protects against the
possibility of founders being prevented prematurely from realizing
their long-term strategic vision (as is a risk with the time-centered
sunset model); (b) it avoids the moral hazard and other perverse
controller incentives that are prone to ensue from time-centered sunsets; and (c) unlike both the time- and ownership-centered models
(which are motivated primarily by agency cost concerns), the
transfer-centered model is sensitive to the powerful non-financial
Chair in Corporate/Financial Law, University College London, UK. I am grateful to Dennis Amoah, Tim Bowley, Christopher Bruner, Arjun Gopalakrishnan,
Ayrton Hopkins and Bernie Sharfman for their extremely helpful comments
on an earlier draft of this Article. Earlier versions of this Article were presented at corporate law workshops held at UCL Laws and the University of
Cambridge Law Faculty, in May and June 2019, respectively. I am grateful for
comments and criticisms received from participants at both those events, and
especially to Jo Braithwaite, Sam Buell, Ann Sofie Cloots, Charles Elson, Eleanore Hickman, Sarah Paterson, Martin Petrin, Bobby Reddy, Felix Steffek
and Simon Witney. The views expressed, together with any outstanding errors,
are those of the author alone.
*
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incentives that controllers typically have to safeguard and promote
firm value, even where their corporate control rights significantly
outweigh their corresponding cash flow rights. Accordingly, it suggests that the SEC and principal U.S. exchanges should resist recent calls from influential investor-related bodies to mandate
time-based sunsets. Instead, domestic policymakers should look
overseas to Hong Kong and Singapore, whose respective listing authorities have recently introduced transfer-based sunset requirements
for DCS issuers, in considering the most appropriate blueprint for
any future regulatory initiatives in this regard.
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INTRODUCTION
Dual-class stock (DCS) structures have spread exponentially
in recent years across much of America’s public company community.1 Since the turn of the present century, the annual percentage
of U.S.-listed companies adopting DCS structures has increased
by a factor of almost twenty in the same number of years.2 Moreover,
26% of companies that conducted initial public offers (IPOs) on
U.S. markets in 2019 had DCS structures.3 As a consequence of these
developments, dual-class listed companies account for an estimated
total market capitalization of nearly $4 trillion today,4 including
9% of the S&P 100.5 One leading commentator has described the
DCS phenomenon as “the most important issue in corporate governance today.”6
Despite their contemporary vogue connotations, DCS structures are by no means a novelty of today’s hi-tech Silicon Valley
growth industries.7 Rather, they have been a feature of corporate
See Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Comm’r, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, PERPETUAL DUAL-CLASS STOCK: THE CASE AGAINST CORPORATE ROYALTY (Feb. 15, 2018),
1

https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/perpetual-dual-class-stock-case-against-cor
porate-royalty [https://perma.cc/W7Q9-MM3W].
2 See id.; see also Navanwita Sachdev, Why the Dual-Class Stock Structure
is Popular with Tech Companies, THE SOCIABLE (Mar. 6, 2019, 11:46 AM), https://
sociable.co/business/why-dual-class-stock-structure-popular-tech-companies/
[https://perma.cc/A3L2-5F5G].
3 COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVS., DUAL-CLASS IPO SNAPSHOT: 2017–2019
STATISTICS, https://www.cii.org/files/2019%20Dual%20Class%20Update%2for
%20Website%20FINAL(2).pdf [https://perma.cc/7JA7-SXPM] [hereinafter CII
DUAL-CLASS IPO].
4 Bernard S. Sharfman, A Private Ordering Defense of a Company’s Right to
Use Dual Class Share Structures in IPOs, 63 VILL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2018).
5 Charles M. Elson & Craig K. Ferrere, Unequal Voting and the Business
Judgment Rule, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REGUL. (Apr. 7,
2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/04/07/unequal-voting-and-the-busi
ness-judgment-rule/ [https://perma.cc/JN6N-BS8V]; see also David A. Bell,
Corporate Governance Survey—2018 Proxy Season Results, FENWICK & WEST
LLP (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.fenwick.com/publications/pages/corporate-gover
nance-survey-2018-proxy-season-results.aspx [https://perma.cc/7TZV-BR7K].
6 John C. Coffee, Jr., Dual Class Stock: The Shades of Sunset, COLUM. L.
SCH. BLUE SKY BLOG (Nov. 19, 2018), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2018
/11/19/dual-class-stock-the-shades-of-sunset/ [https://perma.cc/4FP2-263R].
7 As one leading commentator has recorded, “one share–one vote is not the
historical norm” but rather, “[t]o the contrary, limitations on shareholder voting
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governance, in the United States at least, since the late nineteenth century.8 For much of this time, DCS structures have been
either largely prohibited or, conversely, regarded in a fairly benign
light,9 if not ignored outright as a seemingly dull and technical
aspect of corporate finance.10 Initially, concern for controller unaccountability to investors prompted the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) to prohibit nonvoting stock entirely in 1926 and, after
1940, to insist on one-vote-per-share as a mandatory U.S. listing
condition.11 These requirements persisted until the mid-1980s,
when competitive considerations with respect to the market for
listings eventually prompted the main U.S. exchanges to adopt a
more permissive regulatory stance on the matter.12
For the remainder of the twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries, dual-class and other multi-vote capital structures remained a fairly peripheral and uncontroversial element of the
rights in fact are as old as the corporate form itself” such that “[t]oday’s dual
class capital structures thus were almost more of a revival of the historical
norm than a departure from it.” Stephen M. Bainbridge, Understanding Dual Class
Stock Part I: An Historical Perspective, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Sept. 9,
2017), https://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2017/09
/understanding-dual-class-stock-part-I-an-historical-perspective.html
[https://
perma.cc/8DMY-ADEE].
8 See Sharfman, supra note 4, at 8. For a more thorough historical overview
of the development and regulatory treatment of DCSs in the United States throughout the past century, see Samuel L. Hayes et al., Dual Class Share Companies,
Background Note 9-306-032 HARV. BUS. SCH., 1–3 (Aug. 8, 2005), https://www
.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=32631 [https://perma.cc/D4DS-4Q3P].
9 In particular, DCS structures have traditionally been (and, to a large extent, remain) popular in certain media industries, purportedly as a means of
safeguarding long-term journalistic independence and integrity in the face of
potential outside-investor demands for short-term profit maximization. See Jill
E. Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The Problem of Sunsets, 99 B.U. L. REV.
1057, 1061, 1066–67 (2019).
10 According to one commentator, “[n]ot long ago, even simple dual-class capital
structures were the anachronistic refuge of either media conglomerates or oldstyle industrial titans,” with media companies in particular having traditionally
deployed dual-class voting structures “when the requirements for journalistic
integrity and independence from the market demanded a safe-harbor fortified by
an impregnable curtain of voting control.” Elson & Ferrere, supra note 5.
11 See Sharfman, supra note 4, at 8.
12 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual
Dual Class Stock, 103 VA. L. REV. 585, 596 (2017).
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corporate landscape,13 attracting limited academic and policy scrutiny during this time.14 This began to change following Google’s
high profile dual-class listing in 2004, with Facebook notably following suit in this regard in 2012.15 Today, in addition to Google (now
listed under its parent company’s name Alphabet)16 and Facebook,
other well-known U.S. listed companies with DCS structures17 include Snap, Lyft, Groupon, TripAdvisor, Nike, Levi Strauss, Ford,
CBS, Comcast, News Corporation, The New York Times Company, and Berkshire Hathaway.18
In the wake of the rapid proliferation and growing public
salience of DCS in recent years, hostility towards differential vote
capital structures has re-intensified with a comparable degree of
13 By contrast, London’s indigenous institutional investor community (and,
in particular, the influential Association of British Insurers) maintained a consistently hostile stance toward deviation from the conventional one-vote-per-share
norm within the U.K.’s listed company sector throughout this time, a position
that largely persists today. See REINIER R. KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF
CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 81–82 (3rd ed.
2017) [hereinafter ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW]; Marc T. Moore & Edward
Walker-Arnott, A Fresh Look at Stock Market Short-Termism, 41 J.L. & SOC’Y
416, 442 (2014).
14 In 1988, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) unsuccessfully sought to introduce Rule 19c-4, which, in effect, would have mandated
one-vote-per-share for all U.S.-listed companies as a universal stock exchange
requirement. Sharfman, supra note 4, at 9. However, a federal district court subsequently enjoined this rule on the premise that the SEC significantly exceeded
its statutory rule-making authority under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
to only regulate matters pertaining to securities-market disclosure, as opposed
to issues of substantive corporate governance, which were the appropriate domain of individual states. See id.
15 See Dorothy S. Lund, Nonvoting Shares and Efficient Corporate Governance,
71 STAN. L. REV. 687, 704, 707 (2019).
16 Although Alphabet actually now has a triple-class structure incorporating a
third class of nonvoting (“C”) shares. On this, see infra Section I.A.
17 For a comprehensive list of current DCS issuers as promulgated and
maintained by the Council of Institutional Investors (CII), see COUNCIL OF
INSTITUTIONAL INVS., DUAL CLASS COMPANIES LIST (2019).
18 Id.; COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVS., COMPANIES WITH TIME-BASED
SUNSETS ON DUAL-CLASS STOCK (Jun. 22, 2020), https://www.cii.org/files/6-22
-20%20Time-based%20Sunsets.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Z8U-MLVF]. This is in spite
of Berkshire Hathaway’s chairman/CEO Warren Buffet curiously pressurizing
for the removal of DCSs in Berkshire Hathaway’s portfolio companies. Vijay
Govindarajan et al., Should Dual-Class Shares Be Banned?, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Dec. 3, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/12/should-dual-class-shares-be-banned [https://
perma.cc/S59Q-5CG5].
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rapidity, especially within the United States’ institutional investment community.19 For instance, the Investor Stewardship Group
(ISG), which represents over sixty major institutional investors with
combined assets of over $31 trillion in market value, has effectively
advocated for U.S.-listed companies to near-universally adhere to a
one share/one vote norm in its influential Corporate Governance
Principles.20 Moreover, since 2017, S&P Dow Jones Indices have systematically excluded any new companies conducting IPOs with
multiple-voting shares from its influential S&P 1500 Composite
Index (including its constituent S&P 500 Index),21 which forms
the benchmark for major index-linked funds’22 multibillion-dollar
Blair Nicholas & Brandon Marsh, Dual-Class: The Consequences of Depriving Institutional Investors of Corporate Voting Rights, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 17, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05
/17/dual-class-the-consequences-of-depriving-institutional-investors-of-corporate
-voting-rights/ [https://perma.cc/3TGT-RBL9].
20 In particular, Principle 2 of the ISG Corporate Governance Principles asserts the general proposition that “[s]hareholders should be entitled to voting
rights in proportion to their economic interest,” while Provision 2.1 recommends
more specifically that “[c]ompanies should adopt a one-share, one-vote standard and avoid adopting share structures that create unequal voting rights
among their shareholders.” Corporate Governance Principles for US Listed
Companies, INV. STEWARDSHIP GRP., https://isgframework.org/corporate-gover
nance-principles/ [https://perma.cc/H36E-5YDM]. Of more immediate significance to the discussion at hand, though, is Provision 2.2 of the ISG Principles,
which further stipulates that:
Boards of companies that already have dual or multiple class
share structures are expected to review these structures on a
regular basis or as company circumstances change, and establish
mechanisms to end or phase out controlling structures at the
appropriate time [in other words, time-centered sunset provisions], while minimizing costs to shareholders.
Id.
21 See Scott Hirst & Kobi Kastiel, Corporate Governance by Index Exclusion,
99 B.U. L. REV. 1229, 1232 (2019).
22 This group includes not just passive (or “tracker”) investment funds but
also those active funds whose performance is benchmarked to a relevant market
index. See Lawrence Carrell, Passive Management Marks Decade of Beating Active
U.S. Stock Funds, FORBES (Apr. 20, 2020, 9:44 PM), https://www.forbes.com
/sites/lcarrel/2020/04/20/passive-beats-active-large-cap-funds-10-years-in-a-row/#
15d052d947b0 [https://perma.cc/DK2W-DAKR]; see also James Chen, Active Management, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/activemanage
ment.asp [https://perma.cc/S2K6-ZEAN].
19
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investment portfolios.23 This controversial decision appears to
have been taken largely in response to concerted lobbying from
institutional investors and their representative bodies.24 In a similar vein, the influential proxy advisory firm Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) has a general policy of recommending that
its clients vote against reelecting the incumbent directors of any
companies that offer differential voting shares as part of an initial
or midstream public offering.25
23 One commentator has reported that “some $8.7 trillion in assets are benchmarked or indexed to the S&P 500,” including a significant proportion of the
asset portfolios managed by the so-called “mega-mutual fund advisors” Blackrock,
Fidelity, Vanguard, and State Street. Sharfman, supra note 4, at 4, 13.
24 See Press Release, S&P Dow Jones Indices, S&P Dow Jones Indices Announces Decision on Multi-Class Shares and Voting Rules (Jul. 31, 2017), https://
www.spice-indices.com/idpfiles/spice-assets/resources/public/documents/561162
_spdjimulti-classsharesandvotingrulesannouncement7.31.17.pdf?force_down
load=true [https://perma.cc/8C5C-HCP5]; Andrew Winden & Andrew C. Baker,
Dual-Class Index Exclusion 4, 10–11 (Rock Ctr. For Corp. Governance, Working Paper Series No. 233, Aug. 6, 2018). For similar recent initiatives to this effect
implemented by other major index providers, see id. at 3, 23–31; FTSE RUSSELL,
FTSE RUSSELL VOTING RIGHTS CONSULTATION—NEXT STEPS 3 (Jul. 2017),
https://research.ftserussell.com/products/downloads/FTSE_Russell_Voting_Rights
_Consultation_Next_Steps.pdf [https://perma.cc/YY3U-LBKW]; MSCI, CONSULTATION ON THE TREATMENT OF UNEQUAL VOTING STRUCTURES IN THE MSCI
EQUITY INDEXES 4 (Jan. 2018), https://www.msci.com/documents/1296102/83
28554/Consultation_Voting+Rights.pdf/15d99336-9346-4e42-9cd3-a4a03ecff3
39 [https://perma.cc/9ARN-LHGN].
25 Specifically, ISS’s current proxy-voting policy recommends that shareholders of public issuers generally vote against, or withhold support for, re-election
of the latter’s incumbent directors “if, prior to or in connection with the company’s public offering, the company or its board [has] implemented a multi-class
capital structure in which the classes have unequal voting rights without subjecting the multi-class capital structure to a reasonable time-based sunset.”
INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES (ISS), UNITED STATES PUBLIC FUND
PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES UPDATES FOR 2020: 2020 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 6
(Dec. 31, 2019), https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/active/specialty/Pub
lic-Fund-US-Policy-Updates.pdf [https://perma.cc/RQ9D-NA4Q] [hereinafter ISS
2019(1)]; see also INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES (ISS), UNITED STATES
PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES: BENCHMARK POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 14 (Nov. 18,
2019), https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/active/americas/US-Voting-Guide
lines.pdf [https://perma.cc/VU4Y-PDKY]. This is buttressed by an additional general default recommendation that shareholders “vote against proposals to create
a new class of common stock” in any investee company. See INSTITUTIONAL
SHAREHOLDER SERVICES (ISS), UNITED STATES PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES:
BENCHMARK POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 32 (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.iss
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On the other hand, in recent years, certain jurisdictions
that have traditionally been averse to permitting DCSs have come
to recognize the potential benefits of taking a more permissive
stance on the matter.26 One of the most intriguing examples in this
regard is Singapore.27 In June 2018, following an extensive consultation process, the Singapore Exchange (SGX) took the landmark
step of liberalizing its formerly preclusive listing requirements,
with respect to differential vote capital structures, to permit issuers
to deviate from the one share/one vote norm subject to specific
regulatory restrictions.28 In taking this step, the SGX expressly
sought to appeal to “companies led by founder entrepreneurs who
require funding for a rapid ramp-up of the business while retaining
the ability to execute on a long-term strategy.”29 This action was
consistent with the country’s30 broader strategic ambition to position itself as “a tech and biomedical hub for start-ups,”31 in
governance.com/file/policy/2019/americas/US-Voting-Guidelines.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/5DLG-QC5U]; see also INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES (ISS),
M&A EDGE NOTE: THE TRAGEDY OF THE DUAL CLASS COMMONS 1, 4 (Feb. 13, 2012),
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/facebook0214.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/WW34-3HJ9].
26 See Aurelio Gurrea-Martínez, Theory, Evidence, and Policy on Dual-Class
Shares: A Country-Specific Response to a Global Debate, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE (July 15, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/07/15
/theory-evidence-and-policy-on-dual-class-shares-a-country-specific-response
-to-a-global-debate/ [https://perma.cc/84ET-NS6E].
27 See Ivy Wong, The Revival of Dual Class Shares, INT’L FIN. LAW REVIEW
(Mar. 10, 2020), https://www.iflr.com/article/b1lmx6clj4l38j/the-revival-of-dual
-class-shares [https://perma.cc/WQE9-MQFT].
28 See SGX Mainboard Rules, Rule 210(10)(f), http://rulebook.sgx.com/node
/4870/revisions/13283/view [https://perma.cc/D6LS-YGX6]; infra text accompanying note 271.
29 Angela Tan, SGX Enters New Era as It Starts Dual Class Shares for Qualifying IPOs, BUS. TIMES (June 27, 2018, 5:50 AM), https://www.businesstimes
.com.sg/stocks/sgx-enters-new-era-as-it-starts-dual-class-shares-for-qualifying
-ipos [https://perma.cc/S7XE-JW32] (quoting SGX CEO Loh Boon Chye).
30 Although Singapore Exchange Ltd. (the holding company that owns and
has ultimate operational control over the SGX) is formally constituted as a private limited company, its principal shareholder (with a 23.3% proportionate
equity stake) is Temasek Holdings, which is one of Singapore’s largest state-owned
sovereign wealth funds. See Singapore Exchange Ltd., NIKKEI ASIAN REVIEW,
https://asia.nikkei.com/Companies/Singapore-Exchange-Ltd [https://perma.cc
/4H3Z-RYRR].
31 SING. EXCH., CONSULTATION PAPER: POSSIBLE LISTING FRAMEWORK FOR
DUAL CLASS SHARE STRUCTURES 1–2 (Feb. 16, 2017) (citing 92 Sing. Parl. Deb.
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recognition of the fact that “DCS listings are increasingly being
considered in industries such as information technology and life
sciences.”32 The reform also appears to have been motivated at least
in part by Manchester United F.C.’s widely documented decision
in 2012 to opt for a NYSE listing in preference to one on the
Singapore Exchange,33 with the SGX’s former prohibition on DCS
having been cited as a principal reason behind this move.34 In a
similar vein, Hong Kong’s recently reformed (post-2017) listings
regime has made limited allowance for DCS structures in the case
of certain “innovative companies” as defined in the Hong Kong
Stock Exchange’s Listing Rules,35 which essentially denotes firms
involved in the production of new technologies or other innovations in which significant research and development (R&D) outlays are entailed.36 This is with an express view to encouraging
emerging mainland Chinese tech companies to opt for a Hong
Kong over United States listing in the future, and it is prompted
in large part by the Chinese e-commerce conglomerate Alibaba’s
controversial decision in 2014 to list on the NYSE instead of its
Hong Kong counterpart.37
Off. Rep. (Ong Teng Koon, Member of Parliament)), https://www.rajahtannasia
.com/media/2716/sgx_dcs_consultation_paper_-sgx_20170216-final.pdf [https://
perma.cc/V4QJ-KENZ].
32 Id. at 2.
33 CHARTERED FIN. ANALYST INST., DUAL-CLASS SHARES: THE GOOD, THE
BAD, AND THE UGLY: A REVIEW OF THE DEBATE SURROUNDING DUAL-CLASS
SHARES AND THEIR EMERGENCE IN ASIA PACIFIC 2 (Aug. 2018), https://www.cfain
stitute.org/-/media/documents/survey/apac-dual-class-shares-survey-report.ashx
[https://perma.cc/D7MA-TU28] [hereinafter DUAL-CLASS SHARES IN ASIA PACIFIC].
34 John Geddie, Singapore Details Rules for Listing of Dual-Class Shares,
Follows Hong Kong, REUTERS (June 26, 2018, 6:24 AM), https://www.reuters
.com/article/sgx-regulation/singapore-details-rules-for-offering-dual-class-shares
-follows-hong-kong-idUSL4N1TS3E3 [https://perma.cc/V4X9-GW4Z].
35 See Alphabet, Inc., Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation of
Alphabet Inc., art. 4(f) (“Conversion”) (Oct. 2, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/Archives
/edgar/data/1652044/000119312515336577/d82837dex31.htm [https://perma.cc
/A9BE-6T4M]; infra text accompanying note 275.
36 See HKEX, CONSULTATION PAPER: A LISTING REGIME FOR COMPANIES
FROM EMERGING AND INNOVATIVE SECTORS 11 (Feb. 2018), https://www.hkex
.com.hk/-/media/HKEX-Market/News/Market-Consultations/2016-Present/Febru
ary-2018-Emerging-and-Innovative-Sectors/Consultation-Paper/cp201802.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3PZR-8N5G].
37 Alibaba’s NYSE listing followed the Hong Kong Exchange’s widely documented refusal to permit the company to list with a DCS structure, which
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In essence, the general policy debate on DCSs hangs on the
purported conflict between, on the one hand, protecting the operational freedom of founders and other trusted corporate leaders to
implement their long-term entrepreneurial vision, unimpeded by
the destabilizing demands of short-termist activist investors38
versus, on the other, protecting outside minority investors from
manifest managerial unaccountability and associated self-dealing
risk.39 However, in recent years, academic debate on DCSs, especially in the United States, has begun to pivot less on the general
merits of permitting, as opposed to prohibiting, DCSs, and more on
the specific middle-ground issues of, first, whether DCSs should be
perpetual or rather should terminate (or “sunset”) at some point in
would have effectively entrenched long-term board control in the hands of its
executive chairman and co-founder, Jack Ma. See Enoch Yiu, Securities Commission Backs Introduction of Dual-Class Shares on Hong Kong Stock Exchange, S.
CHINA MORNING POST (Dec. 20, 2017, 7:28 AM), https://www.scmp.com/busi
ness/companies/article/2124972/securities-commission-backs-introduction-dual
-class-shares-hong [https://perma.cc/5U3K-AT34]. Curiously, Alibaba recently
undertook a $13 billion secondary listing on the Hong Stock Exchange in addition to its continuing NYSE primary listing. See Tom Mitchell, Hong Kong is
Testing Whether Finance Needs the Rule of Law, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2019),
https://www.ft.com/content/e2e3c064-0d07-11ea-bb52-34c8d9dc6d84 (last visited
Oct. 30, 2020). This action has been perceived internationally as a significant
endorsement of the region’s newly liberalized listings framework in otherwise
turbulent socio-political times. See id.; Hudson Lockett & George Hammond,
Alibaba’s Stock Jumps on Hong Kong Trading Debut, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 26,
2019), https://www.ft.com/content/8f7af224-0f3e-11ea-a7e6-62bf4f9e 548a (last
visited Oct. 30, 2020); see also Hong Kong’s Listing Regime Enters New Era, Featuring Emerging and Innovative Firms, HKEX (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.hkex
.com.hk/News/Regulatory-Announcements/2018/180424news?sc_lang=en [https://
perma.cc/HLN4-T234].
38 According to one influential source:
The single most important feature of DCS structures is that
they give founders, entrepreneurs, and other corporate insiders
voting control of the listed entity … [which is purportedly] desirable because it allows charismatic, visionary founders and entrepreneurs to execute their vision (especially in the early years of a
public company) without having to worry unduly about stock
market performance.
DUAL-CLASS SHARES IN ASIA PACIFIC, supra note 33, at 8.
39 See SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, INV. ADVISORY COMM., DUAL CLASS AND OTHER
ENTRENCHING GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC COMPANIES 2–3, 8–9 (Discussion Draft 2012), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee
-2012/discussion-draft-dual-class-recommendation-iac-120717.pdf [https://perma
.cc/34KE-VR2S].
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time, and, second, the most appropriate means of determining when
and how time-limited DCSs should sunset.40 While debate on these
more granular questions is no less fervent, the continuing permissibility of DCSs in at least some conditional format is now becoming
an increasingly common premise of such discussions.41
On the vexing question of optimal sunset design there are
three broad schools of thought,42 each of which will be critically
examined below.43 The first, and increasingly most common, view in
this regard is that sunset provisions should be time-conditioned,
with the effect that a DCS structure automatically sunsets after
a predetermined time period (for example, seven, ten or fifteen
years) unless affirmatively resolved otherwise by a majority of
independent (in other words, non-super-voting) shareholders.44 The
second common view is that sunset provisions should ideally be
ownership-based, such that multiple-vote shares automatically convert, subject to offsetting independent shareholder resolution, to
single-vote shares upon their holder’s proportionate holding of cashflow rights dropping below a predetermined minimum threshold (for
example, 10%, 15%, or 20%).45 And the third common view is that
sunset provisions should be transfer-based, such that DCSs automatically convert (again subject to any countervailing independent
shareholder vote) upon the death, incapacitation, or retirement (from
the company’s board) of their original holder, or if otherwise transferred to someone other than that specified person.46 In the discussion that follows, these three competing schools of thought on the
question of optimal sunset design will be referred to, respectively,
Fisch & Solomon, supra note 9, at 1062–64, 1078–79, 1086.
Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 601.
42 Although it may be disputed that there are in fact four broad schools of
thought on this issue, insofar as there remain a number of commentators wedded to one of the polar extreme views to the effect that there should be no scope
for sunsetting at all, either because DCSs should be perpetual and constrained
only by market forces; or, conversely, because they should be prohibited outright such that the question of sunsetting never becomes an issue in the first
place. See infra Section I.B. However, in the discussion that follows we will present these more juxtaposed arguments separately from those focusing on the
question of optimal sunset design itself. Id.
43 See infra Part II.
44 See infra Section II.A.
45 See infra Section II.B.
46 See infra Section II.C.
40
41
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as: (a) the “time-centered” model, (b) the “ownership-centered” model,
and (c) the “transfer-centered” model of sunset design.47
Against the above background, this Article compares the
relative advantages and disadvantages of each of the above positions. On this basis, it seeks to determine which—if any—of those
models is preferable, whether as an influence for private ordering
at the individual firm level, or as a blueprint for broader-reaching
regulatory policy design. Accordingly, the discussion is structured
as follows. Part I briefly documents the parameters of the general
academic and policy debate on dual-class and other differential vote
capital structures. It begins by explaining the essential structural
features of DCS as a general institutional phenomenon.48 It looks
at the highly variable ways in which they have been dealt with on
a regulatory level across different jurisdictions.49 It then examines the polar extreme positions of the ongoing academic debate
on DCS—which argue, respectively, for outright facilitation versus prohibition of those structures—before assessing how this debate
has increasingly come to focus on the more specific common-ground
concern of optimal sunset design.50 Part II outlines the key features and policy rationales for each of the three principal models
of DCS sunset provision referred to above.
Part III presents a normative argument in favor of the
transfer-centered model and highlights its main comparative advantages over the other two models from both a private ordering
and public-regulatory perspective. Here it will be claimed that the
transfer-centered model is not only less arbitrary in its application
than the competitor models, but also less inclined to elicit moral
hazard and other perverse incentives on the part of corporate
controllers.51 Finally, this Article will posit that the transfer-centered
model has the additional advantage of remaining sensitive to the
powerful non-financial incentives that incumbent controllers typically have to safeguard and promote firm value, even when their
corporate control rights significantly outweigh their corresponding
cash flow rights.52 The Conclusion suggests that, in view of the
See generally infra Parts II–III.
See infra Section I.A.
49 See id.
50 See infra Section I.B.
51 See infra Sections III.A, III.B.
52 See infra Section III.C.
47
48
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complexity and context-dependency of the various factors involved,
there remains a strong case for devolving the question of optimal
sunset design to firm-specific private ordering.53 Nonetheless, to the
extent that such provisions are voluntarily adopted or regulatorily
mandated, whether in the United States or elsewhere, then the
transfer-centered model would appear the least-worst blueprint for
lawyers and/or policymakers to work from.54
I.THE PARAMETERS OF THE DUAL-CLASS STOCK (DCS) DEBATE
A. Essential Features and Regulatory Treatment of DCS
Structures
A dual-class stock (or DCS) structure, according to one authoritative source, is “a share structure that gives certain shareholders voting rights disproportionate to their shareholding” such
that “[s]hares in one class carry one vote, while shares in another
class carry multiple votes.”55 In this regard, DCS structures
constitute one particular form of a broader corporate governance
phenomenon known as a “controlling-minority structure,” a category which also includes stock pyramids and cross-holdings.56 The
common feature of all such structures is that they enable the separation of control and cash flow rights, consequently permitting a
dominant equity investor to enjoy effective voting control over the
firm while holding only a minority of cash flow rights.57 The standard DCS structure—in United States-listed companies at least—
is for multiple-vote (so-called super-voting) shares to carry ten
votes each, with ordinary shares carrying only one vote each.58
For example, Facebook’s 10:1 weighted dual-class structure enables its founder, Mark Zuckerberg, together with a small group of
inside associates, to exercise majority voting control despite having
See infra notes 402–04 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 393–97 and accompanying text.
55 Listing Framework for Dual Class Share Structures, SGX (June 26, 2018),
http://rulebook.sgx.com/sites/default/files/net_file_store/SGX_Mainboard_Rules
_June_26_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/73Z4-ZFWX].
56 On this, see LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK ET AL., CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 295–96 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000).
57 Id. at 295.
58 See infra note 273 and accompanying text.
53
54
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only a 14% cash flow interest in the firm.59 In the case of Alphabet
(Google), meanwhile, Larry Page and Sergey Brin are positioned
to exercise majority voting control on the basis of just an 11% cash
flow interest.60 Moreover, this has remained the case following
Page and Brin’s recent relinquishment of their former managerial
positions as Alphabet’s CEO and President, respectively.61
More recent events would indicate that this trend is becoming
even further intensified.62 In the high-profile 2019 IPO of the ridehailing firm Lyft and social media giant Pinterest (and, somewhat
59 Shannon Bond & Nicole Bullock, Lyft IPO Revs up Debate on Dual-Class
Share Structures, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/c7d3
23ba-36b0-11e9-bd3a-8b2a211d90d5 (last visited Oct. 30, 2020). Although it is
noteworthy that, in Facebook’s 2019 annual shareholder meeting, over 83% of
Facebook’s independent (i.e., single-vote) shareholders supported a recommendation to abolish the company’s DCS structure in view of its perceived mishandling of
a number of recent high-profile corporate scandals. Jake Kanter, Facebook Investors
Voted in Support of Proposals to Fire Mark Zuckerberg as Chairman, but Zuckerberg
Still Holds Power, INC. (June 12, 2019), https://www.inc.com/business-insider
/facebook-investors-vote-in-support-fire-mark-zuckerberg-chairman.html [https://
perma.cc/A4SP-RADK]. This was accompanied by a parallel proposal, which
likewise commanded majority independent shareholder support, in favor of separating the CEO and chairman positions on the company’s board, both of which continue to be held by its founder Mark Zuckerberg. Id. However, Zuckerberg’s
ongoing opposition to the above reforms meant that both proposals were ultimately defeated by his weighted votes cast against the relevant motions. Id.
60 Bobby V. Reddy, Finding the British Google: Relaxing the Prohibition of
Dual-Class Stock from the Premium-Tier of the London Stock Exchange 3 (Nov. 29,
2019) (Univ. of Cambridge Fac. of L. Rsch. Paper, Paper No. 4/2020), https://papers
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3495309 [https://perma.cc/7U97-WCUB].
See also Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 608. To cite an even more extreme example, the 10:1 DCS structure employed by the ride-hailing platform
operator Lyft following its 2019 IPO enables its cofounders Logan Green and
John Zimmer to exercise effective outright voting control despite having a less
than 5% cash flow interest in the firm. See Lucian Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel,
The Perils of Lyft’s Dual-Class Structure, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE
& FIN. REG. (Apr. 3, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/04/03/the-perils of-lyfts-dual-class-structure/ [https://perma.cc/MK7M-K5AF] [hereinafter Bebchuck
& Kastiel, Lyft].
61 See Larry Page & Sergey Brin, A Letter from Larry and Sergey, GOOGLE:
THE KEYWORD (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.blog.google/inside-google/alphabet
/letter-from-larry-and-sergey/ [https://perma.cc/6KYF-2YTN]; Rob Copeland,
Google Co-Founders Page, Brin Give Up Management Roles, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 3,
2019, 6:08 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sundar-pichai-to-replace-larry-page
-as-ceo-of-alphabet-11575409229 [https://perma.cc/Q4WD-GP3R].
62 See Bond & Bullock, supra note 59.
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ominously, in the initial filings for WeWork’s recently aborted IPO
attempt63), the super-voting shares’ voting rights outweighed those
attached to ordinary shares by a 20:1 ratio.64 A small group of
U.S.-listed companies including Snap, Alphabet, and Under Armour have recently gone even further than this and adopted triple
class share structures, which include a third class of nonvoting
(“C”) shares.65 In the case of Snap,66 this structure has moreover
existed since the company’s IPO in March 2017.67
It is well-known that nonvoting or low-vote shares typically
trade at a material discount, not only vis-à-vis multiple-vote shares
but also in relation to the common stock of those firms adopting
an orthodox one share/one vote capital structure.68 This is in
(negative) reflection of the so-called private benefits of control
that the holders of multiple-vote shares are positioned to exploit
63 Attracta Mooney, Big Investors Fight Back over Dual-Class Shares, FIN.
TIMES (Nov. 24, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/bc220535-5055-47ce-811d-fc4
a56d32937 (last visited Oct. 30, 2020).
64 See Benjamin Willis, Will Super-Voting Stock Get a Tax Lyft?, FORBES
(Feb. 6, 2020, 11:58 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/taxnotes/2020/02/06/will
-super-voting-stock-get-a-tax-lyft/#4bd72c3152fd [https://perma.cc/PJ2A-6FEW].
However, it is noteworthy that Lyft’s major competitor Uber ultimately opted
against adopting a multiple-vote capital structure in its high-profile 2019 IPO
on the NYSE, having earlier removed a DCS structure that had formerly protected the company’s early stage investors (including its controversial cofounder
Travis Kalanick) as a condition of attracting a $9 billion pre-IPO investment from
SoftBank. Bond & Bullock, supra note 59.
65 See Kaitlin Descovich et al., Voting Rights Gone in a Snap—Unequal Voting Rights Back in the Spotlight, GOVERNANCE & SEC. WATCH (Apr. 3, 2017),
https://governance.weil.com/whats-new/voting-rights-gone-in-a-snap-unequal
-shareholder-voting-rights-back-in-the-spotlight/ [https://perma.cc/PF2Z-J5T7].
66 Facebook unsuccessfully attempted to implement a similar structure in
2018 to enable its founder Mark Zuckerberg to maintain majority voting control over the firm even after selling a significant proportion of his initial multivote shares to fund personal philanthropic ventures. See DUAL-CLASS SHARES
IN ASIA PACIFIC, supra note 33, at 8.
67 See id. at 62. Alternatively (and much less commonly today in U.S.-listed
companies at least), a DCS structure might be constituted by a so-called “hardwiring” provision whereby a controlling minority is entitled to a fixed percentage
of votes in annual shareholder meetings, notwithstanding the corresponding
proportion of equity that they happen to own at any particular point in time.
See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 608.
68 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Essay, The End of History for
Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L. J. 439, 462 (2001).
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at the expense of the low- or nonvoters.69 Insofar as investors are collectively capable of pricing the relative outside shareholder friendliness of these alternative vote distributions, then it may well be
argued (as many commentators have) that the evaluation of DCS
structures is ultimately best left to the invisible hand of stock market forces.70 Indeed, such an ethos essentially characterizes the
modern regulatory stance on this issue that has prevailed in the
United States since the mid-1980s.71 Accordingly, under NYSE and
NASDAQ listing rules alike, both multiple-vote shares and nonvoting shares are permitted at IPO stage.72 However, so-called “midstream” variations in capital structure that disparately reduce or
restrict the voting rights of existing shareholders are prohibited.73
While it is customary to think of the U.S. corporate governance
framework as an influential yardstick for broader global developments in the field,74 this is one area in which—viewed from a comparative standpoint—the contemporary American position would
appear to be more international outlier rather than norm.75 Indeed,

See ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 13, at 79–80.
See infra notes 97–98 and accompanying text.
71 See Bebchuck and Kastiel, supra note 12 and accompanying text. Other
jurisdictions adopting a generally permissive regulatory stance in respect of DCSs
today. See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 599 (including the jurisdictions
of Canada, Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands); see also Zoe Condon, Comment, A Snapshot of Dual-Class Share Structures in the Twenty-First Century: A
Solution to Reconcile Shareholder Protections with Founder Autonomy, 68 EMORY
L. J. 335, 357 (2018) (including jurisdiction of France); Koji Toshima,
Cyberdyne’s Dual-Class IPO, 40 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 43, 43 (2015) (including jurisdiction of Japan).
72 See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 597.
73 See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, Rule 313.00
(2020), https://nyse.wolterskluwer.cloud/listed-company-manual [https://perma
.cc/E6S4-76P4]; see also NASDAQ STOCK MARKET LISTING RULES, Rule 5640
(last amended Dec. 3, 2019), https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/rulebook/nasdaq
/rules/nasdaq-5000#nasdaq-rule_5600 [https://perma.cc/UEH9-QQ7F]. Although,
as against the above prohibition on midstream conversion of existing common
stock to dual-class status, it has recently been argued that “single-class firms should
be given an option to convert to dual-class shares through a shareholder vote, in
order to carry out significant transformations, instead of having to completely
delist in order to achieve that goal.” Govindarajan et al., supra note 18.
74 See generally Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 68.
75 See id. at 456.
69
70
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the general regulatory tolerance shown towards DCS structures in
the U.S. listings environment puts it in stark contrast with numerous
other jurisdictions across the world including Austria,76 Belgium,77
Brazil,78 Germany,79 Italy,80 Spain,81 and the United Kingdom.82
A common feature of all the above countries’ respective corporate
and/or securities law systems is their adoption of a much more
protectionist (by U.S. standards)—if not altogether prohibitive—
stance concerning the regulatory treatment of multi-vote capital
structures in listed companies.83 At a supranational level, meanwhile, the so-called “breakthrough rule” embodied in the European
Union Takeover Directive is designed to mitigate the risk of DCSs
and other insider-friendly voting structures being used as a preclusive roadblock to cross-border corporate control bids within the
EU single market environment.84
76 See MARCCUS PARTNERS & THE CTR. FOR EUROPEAN POL’Y STUD., THE
TAKEOVER BIDS DIRECTIVE ASSESSMENT REPORT 196–97 (2012), https://op.eu
ropa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/67501b75-7583-4b0d-a551-33051d8
e27c1 (last visited Oct. 30, 2020) [hereinafter TAKEOVER BIDS].
77 See id.
78 In Brazil, DCSs are prohibited in the voluntary listing segment Novo Mercado, but are otherwise permitted. See PEDRO MATOS, CFA INST., AN ASSESSMENT OF DUAL-CLASS SHARES IN BRAZIL 1 (2018), https://www.cfainstitute.org/-/me
dia/documents/support/advocacy/dual_class_shares_in_brazil.ashx [https://perma
.cc/4QRD-DR84].
79 Germany has an outright legal prohibition on multiple vote shares along
with significant limitations on the issuance of restricted- or non-voting shares.
See DUAL-CLASS SHARES IN ASIA PACIFIC, supra note 33, at 29.
80 TAKEOVER BIDS, supra note 76, at 196.
81 See id.
82 See id.
83 See Jennifer Payne, Time to Make the Board Neutrality Rule Mandatory
in the EU, OXFORD BUS. L. BLOG (June 7, 2016), https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business
-law-blog/blog/2016/06/time-make-board-neutrality-rule-mandatory-eu [https://
perma.cc/9ND3-W8JS].
84 The breakthrough rule, which is set out in Article 11 of the EU Takeover
Directive, is triggered by an offeror’s (that is, bidder’s) acquisition of at least 75% of
equity or cash flow rights in the offeree (in other words, target) company. Council
Directive 2004/25/EC, art. 11, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12, 20 (EC). Once implemented, this
provision has the effect of automatically converting any multi-vote shares in the
offeree company to single-vote status for the purpose of any general meeting of
shareholders that is convened to decide on whether any frustrative bid defense(s)
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Amongst the most interesting examples in this regard is the
United Kingdom where, despite unorthodox share voting structures
having been treated in a liberal manner by the English courts,85
London’s traditional capital market norms have proved considerably
less tolerant.86 Moreover, the new (post-2013) enhanced listing

should be deployed. Id. This consequently enables the offeror—metaphorically
speaking—to permeate the wall of insulation that the weighted voting structure
would otherwise have provided to the offeree company’s management in the face
of a hostile acquisition attempt. See TAKEOVER BIDS, supra note 76, at 195.
Notably, the breakthrough rule does not apply mandatorily across the EU, but
rather only takes effect at a domestic level if, and when, a member state affirmatively “opts in” to its application. Id. at 188. An Assessment Report on the
Takeover Directive’s implementation carried out in 2012 found that, despite the
breakthrough rule’s initial promise in 2004 to help facilitate a free pan-European
market in corporate control, only one member state (namely Estonia) had actually
applied the provision in full at a domestic level. Id. at 195. However, as highlighted above, the fact that in numerous EU member states including Belgium,
Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom, DCS structures are either difficult
or impossible to implement in listed companies in any event, arguably renders
the limited domestic take-up of the breakthrough rule less materially significant in practice. See supra notes 76–83 and accompanying text.
Curiously, despite the common association of the breakthrough rule with
the EU capital markets regime, its impact has actually been much more extensive in Japan where it exists today as a general listing requirement of the Tokyo
Stock Exchange. See Toshima, supra note 71, at 43. See generally Payne, supra
note 83; Thomas Papadopoulos, The Mandatory Provisions of the EU Takeover Bid
Directive and Their Deficiencies, 6 L. & FIN. MKTS. REV. 525 (2015).
85 See, for example, Lord Upjohn’s classic dictum in the landmark House of
Lords decision in Bushell v. Faith [1970] AC 1099 (HL) 1109 (appeal taken from
Eng.), to the effect that “Parliament has never sought to fetter the right of the
company to issue a share with such rights or restrictions as it may think fit.”
86 See Moore & Walker-Arnott, supra note 13, at 442. It has been recorded that:
[i]n the eyes of the United Kingdom’s major [domestic] shareholding institutions and their representative organizations (especially the Association of British Insurers), differential voting
entitlements have traditionally been viewed as an illegitimate distortion of shareholder democracy and—more worryingly—a means
by which unscrupulous corporate managers can extract benefits
far in excess of their corresponding cash-flow rights in the firm.
Id. Consequently, “the [London] market has for many decades exhibited something of a quasi-religious devotion to the democratic mantra of one share/one
vote” as an “unwritten but yet highly influential principle.” Id.
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regime87 applicable to premium-listed88 companies on the London
Stock Exchange’s main market requires that such higher-tier issuers conform to the dual equality and proportionality principles
as set out within U.K. Listing Rules.89 The former of those principles dictates that “[a]ll equity shares in a class that has been admitted to premium listing must carry an equal number of votes
on any shareholder vote.”90 More significantly for the discussion
at hand, the latter principle insists that “[w]here a listed company
has more than one class of securities admitted to premium listing,
the aggregate voting rights of the securities in each class should
be broadly proportionate to the relative interests of those classes
in the equity of the listed company.”91
On this generally, see FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, CP13/15, FEEDBACK
ON CP12/25: ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LISTING REGIME AND
FURTHER CONSULTATION (2013), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/consultation
87

/cp13-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/89V3-HGTW]; Roger Barker & Iris H.Y. Chiu,
Protecting Minority Shareholders in Blockholder-Controlled Companies: Evaluating the UK’s Enhanced Listing Regime in Comparison with Investor Protection
Regimes in New York and Hong Kong, 10 CAP. MKTS. L. J. 98 (2015).
88 An equity issuer on the main market of the London Stock Exchange has
the option of undertaking either a standard or premium listing. LONDON STOCK
EXCHANGE, MAIN MARKET: A GUIDE TO LISTING ON THE LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE
8, 15 (2010), https://docs.londonstockexchange.com/sites/default/files/documents
/guide-main-market-pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9DQ-SRR8]. In the latter instance,
the issuer essentially agrees to be subject to a more rigorous compliance burden
than its standard-listed counterparts with respect to key disclosure and internal
governance matters, as the payoff for (in theory at least) engendering higher trust
from investors and reducing its ongoing cost of capital accordingly. Id. at 8. In
particular, the so-called “super-equivalent” rules applicable to premium-listed
companies notably go beyond the minimal requirements under EU law to which
London’s standard-listed segment is subject. Id. at 15.
89 See U.K. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., FCA HANDBOOK: LISTING RULES LR 7.2.1.A
(2020), https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/LR.pdf [https://perma.cc
/7YAR-WJ32].
90 Id.
91 Id. (emphasis added). The equality and proportionality principles applicable to London’s premium-listed market segment are reinforced today by the
additional independent business requirement, whereby “[a]n applicant [for
premium listing] must demonstrate that it carries on an independent business
as its main activity.” Id. at LR 6.4.1. This entails (inter alia) that the relevant
issuer must have access to financing from more than one person or group and must
not be subject to overarching strategic control on the part of any other person or
group. See id. at LR 6.4.3. Relatedly, an applicant for premium listing that has
a controlling shareholder must be able to show that it is capable of carrying on
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Although—as highlighted above92—the U.K. enhanced listing
regime is just one of many domestic and supranational regulatory
frameworks to have adopted a broadly hostile stance in relation
to DCSs,93 it is nonetheless an example that merits special attention in the context of the discussion at hand. This is because it
demonstrates that a country with a fundamentally similar capital
market environment to the United States,94 and also a broadly
similar politico-economic tradition,95 can take a starkly different
an independent business despite that shareholder’s presence, having regard (inter
alia) to whether that shareholder is able directly or indirectly to influence the
company’s operations, and also to whether the company has access to any independent sources of finance other than that shareholder. Id. at LR 6.5.
Furthermore, any applicant for premium listing that has a controlling shareholder (including a DCS or other controlling minority structure) must enter into
a written and legally binding agreement with that shareholder (known as a
relationship agreement), under which the controlling shareholder undertakes
not to circumvent the issuing company’s compliance with the above requirements
by seeking unduly to influence its strategy, operations, or financing. Id. at LR
6.5.4. Finally, any such higher-tier issuer is required to hold a dual shareholder
approval vote both including and excluding any controlling shareholder(s) on
the (re)election of any of its independent directors, albeit that a negative independent (that is, noncontrolling) shareholder vote does not in itself necessarily
impede reelection of any candidate(s) that have the controller’s support. Id. at
LR 9.2.2E–F. On the above dual-vote procedure and the practical limitations
thereof, see Bobby V. Reddy, The Fat Controller: Slimming Down the Excesses
of Controlling Shareholders in UK Listed Companies, 38 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
733, 742–47 (2018).
92 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
93 Id.
94 Like the United States, the United Kingdom is renowned today (at least
in corporate governance terms) for its characteristic system of widely dispersed
public company share ownership and, correspondingly, the substantial absence
(in relation to continental European and Asian style “blockholder” governance
systems at least) of dominant family, state, or other controlling shareholder
influences in this context. See MARC MOORE & MARTIN PETRIN, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: LAW, REGULATION AND THEORY 10–14 (2017). See generally BRIAN
R. CHEFFINS, CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: BRITISH BUSINESS TRANSFORMED chs. 9–10 (2008).
95 See MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT 98–103 (2003). Although, for a more nuanced transatlantic comparative analysis in this regard, see generally CHRISTOPHER
M. BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD: THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SHAREHOLDER POWER ch. 5 (2013); Brian R. Cheffins,
Putting Britain on the Roe Map: The Emergence of the Berle-Means Corporation
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regulatory and policy position in relation to DCSs where this is
deemed necessary to combat the threat to minority shareholder
welfare posed by potentially overreaching corporate controllers.96
The ensuing inference, at least insofar as U.S. corporate governance is concerned, is that the United States’ permissive modern
stance on DCS structures in publicly traded companies is by no
means the only possible way for it to go here.
B. The Polar Extremes of the DCS Debate: Facilitation Versus
Prohibition
1. The Case for Facilitation
In the eyes of DCS defenders, the recent spread of insideroriented capital structures is evidence of a well-functioning market
dynamic at work.97 Accordingly, entrepreneurs and investors who
in the United Kingdom, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES: CONVERGENCE
DIVERSITY 147 (Joseph A. McCahery et al. eds., 2002); Marc T. Moore,
Shareholder Primacy, Labour and the Historic Ambivalence of UK Company
Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE HISTORY OF CORPORATE AND COMPANY
LAW 142 (Harwell Wells ed., 2018).
96 See BRUNER, supra note 95, at 143–44. However, against the above background, it is curious to note recent media reports that the U.K. government
has been consulting privately with London’s institutional investment community, potentially with a view to reforming the country’s listings framework so
as to make it more attractive to high-growth firms, including dynamic tech
startups. Reddy, supra note 60, at 4. Whether this will result in the U.K. Listing
Authority relaxing to some extent its current prohibition on DCS within London’s
premium listed sector remains to be seen. In the present author’s opinion such
an outcome is unlikely, although for a contrary view on the matter see Reddy,
supra note 60, at 4. See Daniel Thomas, Philip Stafford & Patrick Jenkins, UK
Seeks Change in Listing Rules to Lure Tech Start-ups, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2019),
https://www.ft.com/content/d4d2da5a-fee8-11e9-be59-e49b2a136b8d (last visited
Oct. 30, 2020); Fin. Times Ed. Bd., Why Dual-Class Shares Deserve Consideration,
FIN. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/6f576e60-0231-11ea-be59
-e49b2a136b8d (last visited Oct. 30, 2020). See generally HM TREASURY, FINANCING
GROWTH IN INNOVATIVE FIRMS: CONSULTATION (Aug. 2017), https://assets.publish
ing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/642
456/financing_growth_in_innovative_firms_consultation_web.pdf [https://perma
.cc/A6J9-F3YH].
97 See Sharfman, supra note 4, at 1–3; Bernard S. Sharfman, The Undesirability of Mandatory Time-Based Sunsets in Dual Class Share Structures: A
Reply to Bebchuk and Kastiel, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 1, 2–4 (2019) [hereinafter Sharfman, Sunsets].
AND

2020]

DESIGNING DUAL-CLASS SUNSETS

115

are favorable to DCSs in their unbridled format are free to support any company’s adoption of such a voting structure voluntarily, whether at the IPO stage or thereafter.98 Vice versa, those
firms whose market circumstances and organizational characteristics are more attuned to the standard one share/one vote model
always have the option of adopting either the default single-class
voting structure or, alternatively, some contractually bespoke sunset
clause in their certificate of incorporation.99 On this premise, the
fact that so many DCS structures persist is a sign of their presumptive efficiency.100 The essential normative claim here is that
entrepreneurs’ continuing widespread adoption of DCSs, and investors’ corresponding widespread tolerance of such structures, is
testament to the propensity of DCSs to reduce the net costs of
production for many firms.101 Otherwise, DCSs would necessarily
have been precluded—or, at least, substantially eradicated—by
the market-driven natural selection process.102
See NASDAQ, THE PROMISE OF MARKET REFORM: REIGNITING AMERICA’S
ECONOMIC ENGINE 17 (Feb. 2018), https://www.nasdaq.com/docs/Nasdaq_Blue
print_to_Revitalize_Capital_Markets_April_2018_tcm5044-43175.pdf [https://
perma.cc/5NH4-GSTN]; see also Sharfman, supra note 4, at 6.
99 On the principal broad choices available to companies in this regard, see
discussion infra Sections II.A–C.
100 For a critical appraisal of the concept of presumptive (or a priori) efficiency as adopted within law and economics scholarship generally, see Paddy
Ireland, Defending the Rentier: Corporate Theory and the Reprivatisation of the
Public Company, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE COMPANY 162 (John Parkinson
et al. eds., 2000).
101 On the relation between corporate control rights and the firm’s overall
net production costs generally, see Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Essay,
Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law and Governance, 117 COLUM.
L. REV. 767, 783 (2017).
102 On the notion of securities market forces as a (presumptively efficient)
natural selection mechanism, see generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL
R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 1 (1991). Easterbrook
and Fischel posit that:
self-interested entrepreneurs and managers, just like other investors, are driven to find the devices most likely to maximize
net profits. If they do not, they pay for their mistakes because
they receive lower prices for corporate paper. Any one firm may
deviate from the optimal measures. Over tens of years and
thousands of firms, though, tendencies emerge. The firms and
98
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On one view, the spread of DCS structures in the U.S. stock
market environment can be seen as a response to a largely U.S.specific phenomenon: that is, the increasing concentration of
the country’s traditionally fragmented public company ownership
base, and the corresponding centralization of corporate governance influence in the hands of a relatively small and increasingly
interconnected group of institutional investor bodies.103 Allied
to this development is the significantly enhanced challenge to
managerial hegemony posed by activist hedge funds, who have
shown a growing willingness to use (actual or threatened) proxy
contests as a means of extracting major concessions from boards
and/or CEOs on key strategic or financial matters, against the
backdrop of the latter’s potential imminent displacement.104 One
notable consequence of this conspicuous landscape shift has been
a diminution in the functional value of U.S. corporate law’s
characteristic principle of director primacy,105 whereby boards of
directors are perceived as exercising largely untrammeled prerogative106 in determining the strategic direction of the business.107
DCS structures can thus be regarded as a crucial bulwark for public
company boards and managers against destabilizing pressures
from activist hedge funds and other aggressive capital market

managers that make the choices investors prefer will prosper
relative to others.
Id. at 6.
103 See David J. Berger, Why Dual Class Stock? A Response to CII’s Petition
to NASDAQ for Mandatory Sunset Provisions 7–8 (2009) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3365154 [https://perma
.cc/6CG9-QKAF].
104 See generally Sharfman, supra note 4, at 12; Bernard S. Sharfman, The
Tension Between Hedge Fund Activism and Corporate Law, 12 J. L. ECON. &
POL’Y 251 (2016).
105 Insofar as Delaware corporations are concerned, the doctrinal basis of
the director primacy principle is § 141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation
Law, which provides that “[t]he business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board
of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West 2020).
106 On this, see generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The
Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 547, 547–52 (2002).
107 See Sharfman, supra note 4, at 23–25.
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actors,108 thereby resetting U.S. corporate governance’s conventional board-centric equilibrium.109
The propensity of DCS structures to shift the balance of
corporate decision-making power away from “outside” minority
shareholders, and—correspondingly—towards “inside” owner controllers aligns with a parallel shift that has occurred on an academic level in recent years.110 This has involved a progressive
withdrawal by corporate law scholars from the orthodox “agency
costs” thought paradigm,111 which for the past four decades has
lent sustained conceptual support to U.S. corporate governance’s
prevailing shareholder value orientation.112 In its place, a group
of alternative theories of corporate governance has evolved, which
in varying ways purports to provide a more balanced and insideroriented view of corporate decision-making.113 The intellectual
precursor to this evolving countermovement was Margaret Blair
and Lynn Stout’s classical “team production” theory of the firm.114
Blair and Stout’s theory essentially sought to portray the board of
directors, rather than shareholders, as the corporation’s supreme
governance authority.115 Shareholders were correspondingly relegated to the status of a mere productive input provider, in their case,
108 As Goshen and Squire have highlighted, “neither activist hedge funds
nor hostile raiders can force the managers of a dual-class firm to change their
business strategy.” See Goshen & Squire, supra note 101, at 806.
109 On this, see Bainbridge, supra note 106.
110 See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and
Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 301–02 (1983); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 288–89 (1980); Michael
C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 305–06, 309 (1976).
111 The seminal contributions to this landmark school of thought are Fama
& Jensen, supra note 110, at 301–02; Fama, supra note 110, at 288–89; Jensen
& Meckling, supra note 110, at 305–06, 309.
112 On this, see generally Ireland, supra note 100.
113 On this developing alternative school of thought, which the present author has previously termed the post-shareholder-value (or “PSV”) paradigm,
see Marc T. Moore, A Necessary Social Evil: The Indispensability of the Shareholder Value Corporation, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 427, 438–42 (2017).
114 See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 248, 248–49 (1999).
115 Blair and Stout claim that, “[a]s the ultimate decision-making body
within the firm, [directors] are not subject to direct control or supervision by
anyone, including the firm’s shareholders.” Id. at 290.
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of equity capital, to the firm in the same vein as employees and
suppliers.116 Blair and Stout’s theory thus afforded shareholders
no privileged governance status over other stakeholder groups.117
They moreover rejected the notion that corporate law was designed to provide shareholders with any such exalted status.118
Blair and Stout’s essential mantle in this regard has since
been taken up, in varying ways, by a range of other leading scholars
in recent times, such that non-shareholder-centric conceptions of
corporate law that contest the traditional agency costs position
have increasingly become the mainstream view within the legal
academy today.119 Most well-known in this regard is Stephen
Bainbridge’s influential director primacy theory of corporate
governance, which emphatically rejects—both descriptively and
normatively—the notion of shareholders as wielding any sort of superior decision-making influence over boards.120 Contrary to Blair
and Stout, Bainbridge curiously still defends directors’ ultimate

According to Blair and Stout’s model, “boards exist not to protect shareholders per se, but to protect the enterprise-specific investments of all the members
of the corporate ‘team,’ including shareholders, managers, rank and file employees, and possibly other groups, such as creditors.” Id. at 253.
117 For a more recent and detailed exposition of this position by the latter
author, see generally LYNN A. STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW
PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE
PUBLIC (2012).
118 See Blair & Stout, supra note 114, at 287–88. On this, see also Lynn A.
Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163,
174 (2008).
119 See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 106; William W. Bratton & Michael L.
Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653
(2010); Marc T. Moore & Antoine Rebérioux, Revitalizing the Institutional Roots
of Anglo-American Corporate Governance, 40 ECON. & SOC’Y 84 (2011); Simon
Deakin, The Corporation as Commons: Rethinking Property Rights, Governance and Sustainability in the Business Enterprise, 37 QUEEN’S L.J. 339 (2012);
Bernard S. Sharfman, Why Proxy Access is Harmful to Corporate Governance,
37 J. CORP. L. 387 (2012); STOUT, supra note 117; COLIN MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT: WHY THE CORPORATION IS FAILING US AND HOW TO RESTORE TRUST
IN IT (1st ed. 2013).
120 See generally Bainbridge, supra note 106; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Response, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV.
1735 (2006); STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE (2008).
116
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fiduciary responsibility to further shareholders’ interests.121 Significantly, though, he asserts that directors are expected by law
to maximize shareholder wealth in their capacity as, lexically superior, “[p]latonic guardian[s]” of shareholders, as opposed to, lexically
inferior, agents of the latter group.122
More recently, Zohar Goshen and Richard Squire’s principal
costs theory123 has sought to dispute directly the abovementioned
notion that corporate governance, and, by implication, corporate law,
is, and should be, focused exclusively on mitigating agency costs imposed by recalcitrant managerial “agent[s]” on their shareholder
“principal[s]”.124 Adopting a not dissimilar analytical framework to
those of Blair/Stout and Bainbridge, Goshen and Squire add a
significant further dimension to the orthodox agency costs
landscape in the form of their novel concept of “principal costs”.125
According to Goshen and Squire, whereas agency costs are the
losses incurred by the firm and, in turn, its shareholders due to
suboptimal managerial decisions, principal costs conversely
comprise the ultimate losses to shareholders, deriving from
suboptimal decisions and control strategies on the part of
shareholders themselves.126
Such self-imposed shareholder losses can arise either from
incompetent, misjudged, or ill-informed interventions by investors in a company’s internal business affairs, so-called
“principal competence costs”,127 or else by individual investors’
pursuit of certain actions, such as short-term profit focused
activism, that are detrimental to long-term firm—and, ultimately, shareholder—wealth, so-called “[p]rincipal conflict costs.”128
Goshen and Squire posit that any optimal corporate governance
121 See Bainbridge, supra note 106, at 574; Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green,
50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1423–24 (1993).
122 Bainbridge explains how his director primacy model of corporate law “treats
the board of directors as a sort of Platonic guardian whose power devolves from
the set of contracts comprising the corporation as a whole rather than solely from
shareholders.” Bainbridge, supra note 106, at 577.
123 On this, see generally Goshen & Squire, supra note 101.
124 Id. at 778–83.
125 See id. at 796–805.
126 Id. at 770–71.
127 Id. at 786–88.
128 See id. at 791–93.
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structure should be designed to minimize not just agency costs, but
“total control costs,”129 which they define as “the sum of principal
costs and agent costs.”130 In essence, this necessitates investors
being willing to tolerate, in appropriate instances, firms’ adoption
of governance structures, including, amongst other things,
DCSs,131 which are designed to limit the involvement of shareholders in complex or contentious business affairs, with a view to
forestalling potentially irresponsible or misguided actions on
their part.132
DCS structures are also held out by their advocates as a
crucial countermeasure for many listed firms against the pervasive
influence of financialization over modern U.S. corporate governance
practices.133 In this regard, dual-class and other differential voting
structures can be said to provide a degree of strategic breathing
space for corporate controllers from the intense pressure exerted
by quarterly financial reporting hurdles.134 Of course, listed firms
with DCS structures remain subject to the same periodic disclosure requirements as any other issuer of SEC-registered equity

Id. at 770.
Id.
131 Id. at 806–07.
132 An alternative but related rationalization of insider-oriented corporate
ownership structures has recently been advanced in the form of Goshen and
Hamdani’s “idiosyncratic vision” theory. Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 YALE L.J. 560, 576 (2016). The
essential suggestion here is that, where investors and entrepreneurs “hold different beliefs concerning the best way to .... maximize the firm’s expected return,” a DCS structure or other concentrated control structure can be an effective
means of ensuring “that the firm will pursue [the entrepreneur’s] idiosyncratic
vision even against the investors’ objections.” See id. On this, see also Eric Van
den Steen, Disagreement and the Allocation of Control, 26 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
385, 385 (2010).
133 On the financialization of corporate governance norms and practices, see
generally Paddy Ireland, Financialization and Corporate Governance, 60 N. IR.
LEGAL Q. 1 (2009); JULIE FROUD ET AL., FINANCIALIZATION AND STRATEGY: NARRATIVE AND NUMBERS (2006); MICHEL AGLIETTA & ANTOINE REBÉRIOUX, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ADRIFT: A CRITIQUE OF SHAREHOLDER VALUE (2005); William
Lazonick & Mary O’Sullivan, Maximizing Shareholder Value: A New Ideology
for Corporate Governance, 29 ECON. & SOC’Y 13 (2000).
134 See Sharfman, supra note 4, at 14–15.
129
130
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securities.135 However, the adverse consequences of management
failing to conform to consensus earnings estimates are almost certain to be less severe than in the case of one share/one vote issuers, given the effective immunity enjoyed by multiple vote holding
controllers from outside challenge to their incumbency on the part
of proxy contestants.136
The insulation from short-term stock market pressures that
DCSs purportedly provide is said to be valuable not just in terms
of creating a greater scope for the formation and implementation
of long-term business strategies, but also insofar as it can encourage more firms to go public at a relatively early stage in their business life cycle.137 This is because DCSs and other insider-oriented
voting structures enable entrepreneurial founders to “cash out” their
initial equity investment in the business at the IPO stage so as to
gain a market “reward” for their start-up efforts, but—crucially—
without being compelled to give up control of their venture to
outsiders in order to achieve this.138 It has been claimed that, in
turn, permitting DCS structures may help to counteract the progressive decline in listed companies that has occurred over recent
decades, by encouraging more companies that would otherwise
See id. at 9.
On this, see id. at 11–12. As articulated in Google’s IPO documentation
from 2004:
Because of our dual class structure, our founders, executives and
employees will continue to be able to control all matters submitted to our stockholders for approval even if they come to own
significantly less than 50% of the shares of our outstanding common stock. This concentrated control could discourage others
from initiating any potential merger, takeover or other change of
control transaction that other stockholders may view as beneficial.
Google Inc., Registration Statement 89 (Form S-1) (Apr. 29, 2004), https://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312504073639/ds1.htm#toc
16167_10 [https://perma.cc/JF8X-YZGN].
137 A recent paper by Lemley and McCreary underscores the multiple social
benefits of providing enhanced incentives to founder entrepreneurs to opt for
an IPO as the preferred method for “exiting” their start-up investment, instead
of the increasingly more common exit strategy of subjecting the firm to private
acquisition by an industry incumbent. See Mark A. Lemley & Andrew McCreary,
Exit Strategy 15, 48–49 (Stan. L. & Econ. Olin, Working Paper No. 542, 2019).
The authors cite DCS structures, amongst other things, as a potentially significant structural driver in this regard. See id. at 22–23.
138 Id. at 8, 14; see Fisch & Solomon, supra note 9, at 1060–61.
135
136
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remain private or submit to private equity ownership, largely to
avoid the adverse repercussions of pervasive stock market scrutiny, to remain in the public market domain.139
It is noteworthy that those who advocate facilitating DCS
structures typically do not suggest that DCS structures will become
universal, or even the majoritarian norm, within the listed company
community.140 Rather, their rate of adoption is expected to depend—
as at present—on their compatibility with the specific corporate
governance challenges faced at the micro, in other words, individual
firm, level.141 In this regard, Goshen and Squire explain how any
firm’s optimal balance between the dual concerns of agency cost and
principal cost mitigation will depend on a range of micro level factors
including “the firm’s business strategy, its industry, and the personal
characteristics of its investors and managers.”142 Since “each firm
has a distinct division of control rights that minimizes total control costs,” it purportedly follows that “law’s proper role is to allow
firms to select from a wide range of governance structures, rather
than to mandate some structures and ban others.”143
On the above premise, Goshen and Squire attribute the decision by any firm to adopt, or, conversely, refrain from adopting,
a differential voting structure to the relative complexity and
specialism of its business affairs.144 Accordingly, in instances
where investors’ informational expertise deficit vis-à-vis entrepreneurs or other corporate insiders is especially pronounced, it
arguably makes sense for investors to adopt a DCS structure to
mitigate the risk of principal costs, and especially principal competence costs, arising.145 While such an arrangement inevitably
risks occasioning increased agency costs in the investor-controller
See Fisch & Solomon, supra note 9, at 1061.
See Goshen & Squire, supra note 101, at 807.
141 For instance, Goshen and Squire explain how:
[t]he use of a dual-class share structure is a good illustration of
the firm-specific nature of corporate governance, as the structure
may be well-suited to firms in complex industries such as information technology (e.g., Google, Facebook, and LinkedIn), or
to firms whose outside shareholders recognize management’s
unique skills and strategic vision (e.g., Berkshire Hathaway).
139
140

Id.
Id. at 771.
Id.
144 See id. at 771–72.
145 See Goshen & Squire, supra note 101, at 770, 772.
142
143
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relation, any ensuing losses for shareholders will be tolerated
insofar as they are outweighed by the corresponding saving in
principal costs that the DCS structure brings about.146 In this
instance, an overall net positive wealth effect for shareholders is
therefore likely to ensue.147
Those who claim that shareholder voting structures should be
determined in the above bespoke way tend to rely on the presumptive
efficiency of micro level private ordering.148 This position entails
putting considerable faith in stock market pricing mechanisms to
detect and discount effectively the relative value of restricted voting rights to a DCS firm’s common, single-vote, shareholders.149
The underlying belief is that so long as relevant firms remain subject to the traditional securities law principle of full disclosure,150
especially at the IPO stage151 then investors will be equipped to
pass reasonably prudent judgment on the continuing suitability
of their governance, including voting, arrangements.152 The flip
side to this argument is that any attempt by regulators to impose
a standardized governance norm with respect to shareholder voting
structures, for example, a mandatory one-share/one-vote rule, will
run the risk of precluding many firms from adopting more suitable
See id.
However, the authors also acknowledge that, for the same reasons, DCS
structures will likely not be optimal for firms in which those characteristics are
not present. See id. at 771–72.
148 See Dennis P. Sheehan, Comment, Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and
Dual Class Equity, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 315, 317 (Randall
K. Morck ed., 2000).
149 According to Sheehan, “the fact ... that new shareholders willingly buy into
firms in which wealth consequences are not proportional to voting rights .... [suggests] that these new shareholders buy into these firms at prices that protect
them from being exploited.” See id.
150 In the words of one especially eloquent commentary on the matter, “[t]he
American polity has ... carried on a vigorous romance with the idea that the free
flow of information is a potent remedy for social and political ills .... perhaps,
because it meshes so comfortably with the principle of individual choice that
permeates our conventional social philosophy.” Russell B. Stevenson, Jr., The
SEC and the New Disclosure, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 50, 50 (1977).
151 Goshen asserts in this regard that “[w]ith many sophisticated parties,
the IPO market does not suffer from negotiation failures.” Zohar Goshen, Against
Mandatory Sunset for Dual Class Firms, COLUM. L. SCH. BLUE SKY BLOG
(Jan. 2, 2019), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2019/01/02/against-manda
tory-sunset-for-dual-class-firms [https://perma.cc/AUV2-E84Q].
152 See Stevenson, supra note 150.
146
147
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alternative arrangements in this regard, which may well be better suited to mitigate total control costs under the unique circumstances at hand.153
2. The Case for Prohibition
By contrast, critics of DCS structures, and, likewise, other
types of differential voting structure, typically view such arrangements as a significant source of agency costs between multi-voteholding controllers and their common, single vote, stockholding
peers.154 Specifically, it is alleged that DCS enables multi-voteholders to maintain effective control over the firm despite owning
only a minority of cash flow rights, thereby causing a significant
bifurcation between, on the one hand, their scope of managerial
and/or governance power, and on the other, their corresponding
incentive to exercise that power in a diligent and entrepreneurially effective manner.155
Goshen and Squire claim that “[b]ecause the governance structure that
minimizes control costs varies by firm, lawmakers—including courts, regulators, and legislators—should avoid one-size-fits-all solutions.” See Goshen &
Squire, supra note 101, at 774. They argue that:
[I]n the absence of clear market failures, lawmakers should
presume the efficiency of each firm’s chosen governance structure,” and thus “should seek to grow rather than shrink the menu
of governance-structure options .... [by] allow[ing] each firm to tailor its governance structure in the manner that strikes the firmspecific optimal balance between principal costs and agent costs.
Id. at 774, 829.
154 See, e.g., BEBCHUK ET AL., supra note 56, at 295–96; Bebchuk & Kastiel,
supra note 12, at 596–99.
155 For instance, Bebchuk, Kraakman and Triantis argue that “[t]he [controlling minority shareholder] structure lacks the principal mechanisms that
limit agency costs in other ownership structures” in that “[u]nlike in [dispersed
ownership] structures, where controlling management may have little equity but
can be displaced, the controllers of [controlling minority shareholder] companies
face neither proxy contests nor hostile takeovers.” See BEBCHUK ET AL., supra note
56, at 301. The authors further assert that, “unlike in [controlling majority
shareholder] structures, where controlling shareholders are entrenched but internalize most of the value effects of their decisions through their shareholdings, [controlling minority shareholders] may hold a very small fraction of the
cash-flow rights in their firms.” Id.
153
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In turn, the ensuing disparity between control and cash flow
rights arguably incentivizes the controlling minority to expropriate private benefits of control from the firm while bearing only a
limited part of the negative wealth effects of their behavior.156 Such
private control benefits can potentially include shirking, nepotism,157 receipt of exorbitant compensation and hubris-driven
expansionism through, in the more egregious cases of controller
self-dealing, related party transactions and appropriation of corporate opportunities.158 The purported outcome is a classic moral
hazard situation whereby controlling minorities are positioned to
externalize the adverse repercussions of their self-benefitting
actions, or inaction, on other investors, thereby affecting an uncompensated net wealth transfer from common stockholders to
multi-vote-holding controllers.159
In a similar vein, Bebchuk and Kastiel claim that “[t]he combination of entrenchment and limited equity holdings [in DCS companies] produces serious
problems” insofar as “a controller with a minority equity stake may favor choices
that increase the private benefits of control even if those choices substantially
diverge from those of other public shareholders, and no threat of removal exists
to prevent her from pursuing those interests.” See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note
12, at 602. They further posit that: “[t]his distortion of incentives becomes more
severe when the controller of a dual-class company holds a smaller percentage
of the company’s equity capital.” Id. at 602–03. By way of response, Goshen
and Squire refer to critics such as Bebchuk as “[a]gency-cost essentialists—
who [erroneously in Goshen and Squire’s view] believe that the reduction of
agency costs is the essential role of corporate law.” See Goshen & Squire, supra
note 101, at 775.
156 See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
157 That is to say, appointing family members or other associates to executive positions instead of better qualified external candidates. See Morten
Bennedsen et al., Inside the Family Firm: The Role of Families in Succession
Decisions and Performance, 122 Q.J. ECON. 647, 648 (2007).
158 Ronald W. Masulis et al., Agency Problems at Dual-Class Companies, 64 J.
FIN. 1697, 1722 (2009), referred to by Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 603.
159 See BEBCHUK ET AL., supra note 56, at 301. By contrast, in standard majority-controlled firms where there exists no such disparity between control
and cash flow rights, controllers can be expected to bear a significant share of
the adverse wealth effects of any expropriative or otherwise value reducing
activities that they undertake vis-à-vis the firm. See id. DCS critics have argued, moreover, that the agency costs of DCS structures can be expected to
increase exponentially as the proportion of cash flow rights held by a controlling minority decreases in relation to the corresponding percentage of voting
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DCS structures are additionally criticized from the above
perspective insofar as they remove controlling minorities from the
discipline of the outside market for corporate control.160 This is
because any prospective outside control-acquirer will be unable to
gain majority voting control over the firm by gaining the equity
or votes of the firm’s independent (non-controlling) shareholders
alone.161 For this reason, DCSs (and other differential voting
structures) have been criticized for arguably combining the worst
features of orthodox blockholder and widely held corporate ownership systems, that is to say, providing the leeway for controller
exploitation of private benefits of control that is traditionally associated with European and Asian style blockholder systems,
with the absence of effective proprietary incentives on the part of
controllers for which Anglo-American widely held systems are
conventionally renowned for.162
In addition, critics of DCS have contested the abovementioned claim by their academic champions that private ordering
will ultimately produce efficient corporate voting structures, whether
of the multi-class or one-share/one-vote variety.163 Those of an
anti-DCS disposition have contrarily argued that private ordering
is unlikely to lead to efficient governance outcomes because, even in
instances where terminating a dual-class share structure (whether
via an outright takeover of the firm or, alternatively, via the voluntary unification of the firm’s capital structure by its existing controller) would enhance firm efficiency, any ensuing benefits for the
incumbent controller are unlikely to compensate for the private
benefits of control that she will consequently be required to forego.164
For this reason, it has been posited that controlling minorities
cannot be trusted to make the determinative decision on whether
rights. See id. at 310; Paul A. Gompers et al., Extreme Governance: An Analysis
of Dual Class Firms in the United States, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1051, 1084–85
(2010), referred to by Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 603.
160 Kishore Eechambadi, The Dual Class Voting Structure, Associate Agency
Issues, and a Path Forward, 13 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 503, 515 (2017).
161 Id. at 513.
162 See BEBCHUK ET AL., supra note 56, at 299; Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra
note 12, at 602.
163 See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 612–13.
164 See id. at 613.

2020]

DESIGNING DUAL-CLASS SUNSETS

127

to retain or dispense with a DCS structure midstream in a truly
independent and disinterested manner.165
DCS opponents further suggest that common stockholders
are ill-equipped to make rational decisions on public companies’
individual capital structures, whether on an individual or collective basis.166 It is well known that coordination and collective action problems can constrain the capacity of investors, both of an
individual and institutional nature, to take informed decisions
and actions with respect to complex firm-specific matters.167
There is consequent cause to question whether stock market pricing mechanisms are sufficiently sensitive to individual corporate
voting arrangements and other nuanced micro-level concerns.168
In response to such claims, DCS advocates would likely point
to the significant concentration of U.S. public company shareholding
today,169 especially in the hands of the dominant “mega-mutual”170
fund providers such as Blackrock, State Street and Vanguard.171
They might additionally highlight the pervasive and centralized
corporate governance influence wielded today by professional proxy
advisory firms such as Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and
See id. at 617.
See, e.g., id. at 592.
167 On the collective action problem generally as it affects decision-making
and other firms of cooperative action within large business organizations and
other social institutions, see generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); Garrett Hardin, The
Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
168 On this, see Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate
Law: A Generation Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779, 791 (2006); Marc T. Moore, Private
Ordering and Public Policy: The Paradoxical Foundations of Corporate Contractarianism, 34 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 693, 710 (2013). See generally L.A.
Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1395 (1989); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate
Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory
Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549 (1989).
169 See Berger, supra note 103, at 7.
170 This term is attributable to Professor Bernard Sharfman. See Sharfman,
supra note 4.
171 Jonathan Guthrie, The Fallacy Behind the Rise of Passive Fund Management, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/1c4382c6-36
cb-11ea-a6d3-9a26f8c3cba4 (last visited Oct. 30, 2020).
165
166
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Glass, Lewis & Co.172 Indeed, on first reflection at least,173 both the
above developments would appear to have rendered the traditional
Berle-Means dichotomy174 of strong managers and weak owners175
somewhat redundant within the contemporary corporate governance and stock market environments.176
DCS opponents have been quick to point out, though, that—
market concentration factors aside—the so-called mega-mutuals
are for the most part comprised of passive index-linked funds, which
either actively track a particular market index or have their performance periodically benchmarked against any such index.177
The managers of such funds therefore have limited incentives to
engage in ongoing monitoring and evaluation of investee firms’
micro-level governance matters.178 Furthermore, the inevitable
resource limitations of proxy advisory firms mean that they are
likewise constrained with respect to their firm-specific monitoring
activities, causing them typically to focus their energies on specific
blacklisted firms and personnel that pose extraordinary

On this, see Stephen Choi et al., The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or
Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J. 869, 871 (2010); Letter from Bernard S. Sharfman,
Chairman of the Main St. Invs. Advisory Counc., to Vanessa Countryman, Sec’y,
SEC (Dec. 20, 2019) (File No. s7-22-19), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-22-19
/s72219-6571096-201082.pdf [https://perma.cc/JR5E-UG3S].
173 For an alternative argument, to the effect that the relatively passive,
index-linked investment practices of the major U.S. mutual fund providers have
actually exacerbated managerial accountability problems in publicly traded firms,
see Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2030 (2019).
174 See generally Adolf A. Berle & Gardner Means, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
175 On this dichotomy (and the historico-political foundations thereof), see
generally Mark J. Roe, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL
ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994).
176 On the gradual power shift from managers to shareholders that purportedly occurred within U.S. public companies generally throughout the early part
of the present century, see generally Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Embattled
CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987 (2010).
177 See Sharfman, supra note 4, at 13.
178 Winden & Baker, supra note 24, at 10.
172
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governance and/or accountability concerns, arguably at the expense of tracking the many less egregiously problematic cases.179
Allied to the above collective action constraints is the vexing dilemma that typically confronts those outside investors who
are faced with an otherwise highly attractive dual-class IPO.
While a new issuer’s insider-oriented voting structure might pose
accountability and other governance concerns for prospective purchasers of common (single-vote) stock, such worries might conceivably be outweighed by individual investors’ fear of missing out
on what may well turn out to be a collectively popular (or “hot”180)
IPO.181 It follows that, in the absence of reliable information
about how their fellow investors will react to the IPO in question,
each individual investor will likely be reluctant to defect from the
prevailing herd mentality irrespective of their continuing concerns
about the robustness of the relevant firm’s capital structure.182
Accordingly, from the perspective of DCS critics, the combined effect of the above factors is to constrain considerably the
receptiveness of stock market pricing mechanisms to the presence
or absence of DCSs (and other differential voting structures) within
individual public issuers relative to orthodox one-share/one-vote
arrangements.183 This in turn purportedly limits the propensity of
private ordering to operate as an effective surrogate for mandatory
state or exchange driven regulation of corporate capital structures.184 The anti-DCS school thus seeks to establish an essentially paternalistic rationale for some form(s) of public-regulatory
intervention in private ordering of capital structures,185 in the
179 On the limitations of proxy advisors as firm-specific monitors, see generally
Marc T. Moore, “Whispering Sweet Nothings”: The Limitations of Informal Conformance in UK Corporate Governance, 9 J. CORP. L. STUD. 95 (2009).
180 This term is attributable to Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 591.
181 See Reddy, supra note 60, at 26.
182 See Winden & Baker, supra note 24, at 9.
183 See id. at 10.
184 See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1620 (1989).
185 On the paternalistic nature of Anglo-American corporate law generally,
see MARC T. MOORE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE SHADOW OF THE STATE, chs.
6–7 (2013); Marc T. Moore, The De-Privatisation of Anglo-American Corporate
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interest of protecting vulnerable or misguided outside investors
from exploitation at the hands of overreaching entrepreneurial
controllers.186
C. The Shift Towards Sunsets
Until recently, the debate on the relative merits of DCS versus
one-share/one-vote structures has been largely polarized, with
the pivotal normative issue being a fairly straightforward one:
that is, whether DCS should freely be permitted within publicly
traded firms (subject only to full disclosure and private ordering)
or else prohibited by appropriate regulatory means.187 However,
the progressive maturing of this debate has seen a corresponding
convergence of both sides’ respective argumentative positions.188
Consequently, advocates and critics of DCS have, for the most
part, commonly come to accept (albeit with different degrees of
enthusiasm from one another) that any form of outright prohibition on the use of differential voting structures in publicly traded
firms is probably an unrealistic aspiration for the anti-DCS
school.189 In turn, academic and policy discussions have in large
part shifted away from the general binary question of whether
DCS should be permitted or prohibited, and more on the specific
middle-ground concerns of: (i) whether such insider-oriented voting structures should have an indefinite or contingent life span; and
(ii) in the latter instance, precisely how (or, more accurately,
when) the eventual transformation of any multi-vote shares to
common (single-vote) status should take place.190 Hence the current pertinence of so-called “sunset” provisions.191
Sunsets are unquestionably a vogue notion within the U.S.
corporate governance world today.192 For instance, in October
2018, the influential Council of Institutional Investors (CII),
which currently represents 140 major institutional investors with
Law?, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW, ch. 2 (Roman Tomasic
ed., 2016).
186 See, e.g., Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 627.
187 See id. at 590.
188 See Eechambadi, supra note 160, at 511.
189 See id.
190 See id. at 531–32.
191 See id. at 531.
192 See id. at 526.
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a combined asset base worth approximately $4 trillion,193 publicly
(albeit, as yet, unsuccessfully) lobbied both the New York Stock
Exchange and NASDAQ with a view to persuading their respective authorities to introduce a universal requirement for septennial time-based sunset provisions,194 applicable to all new DCS
issuers as a mandatory precondition of listing on each of those
markets.195 In a similar vein, ISS’s current proxy voting policy
with respect to multi-class capital structures states that “[n]o
sunset period of more than seven years from the date of the
IPO will be considered to be reasonable” from an investor

See About CII, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVS., https://www.cii.org
/about [https://perma.cc/VR5G-XDXA].
194 On this, see infra Section II.A. At the same time, the Chartered Financial
Analyst Institute has expressly been “urging” exchanges to consider mandating time-based sunsets of up to five years’ duration as an “absolute maximum.”
See DUAL-CLASS SHARES IN ASIA PACIFIC, supra note 33, at 5.
195 See Letter from Ash Williams, Chair, Council of Institutional Invs. et al., to
Elizabeth King, Chief Regul. Officer, Intercontinental Exch. Inc. (Oct. 24,
2018), https://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/correspondence/2018/20
181024%20NYSE%20Petition%20on%20Multiclass%20Sunsets%20FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6KFX-EA3J]; Letter from Ash Williams, Chair, Council of Institutional Invs. et al., to John Zecca, Senior Vice President, NASDAQ Stock Market (Oct. 24, 2018) (on file with CII.ORG), https://www.cii.org/files/issues_and
_advocacy/correspondence/2018/20181024%20NASDAQ%20Petition%20on%20
Multiclass%20Sunsets%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/CQT9-V6H4] [hereinafter NASDAQ Letter]. On this, see Govindarajan et al., supra note 18. The CII
made an additional appeal to the Delaware State Bar Association to amend
Delaware General Corporation Law so as to prohibit any Delaware corporation
from adopting a multi-class common structure after an initial seven-year postIPO period. See Letter from Ken Bertsch, Exec. Dir., Council of Institutional
Invs. et al., to Henry E. Gallagher, Council Chair, Corp. L. Section, Del. State
Bar Ass’n (Sept. 13, 2019), https://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/corre
spondence/2019/September%2013%202019%20Final%20DGCL%20letter.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G2W9-LM57] [hereinafter Delaware Letter]. After giving due
consideration to the CII’s request, the Council of the Corporation Law Section
of the Delaware State Bar Association unsurprisingly opted to refrain from implementing the CII’s desired reform. See id.; see also Letter from Henry E. Gallagher,
Council Chair, Corp. L. Section. Del. State Bar Ass’n, to Ken Bertsch, Exec. Dir.,
Council of Institutional Invs. et al. (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.cii.org/files/1
-28-2020%20Letter%20to%20CII%20(05512328xCCC1C).pdf [https://perma.cc
/PB4G-ZDWN].
193
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perspective196 Indeed, the sunset issue has come to dominate the
policy agenda in respect of DCS to such an extent lately that, in
the words of current (at time of writing) SEC Commissioner
Robert Jackson, the principal concern in this regard today is no
longer “whether dual-class ownership is always good or bad.”197
According to Jackson, the energies of commentators have instead
been absorbed principally in seeking to answer the more focused
question of “whether dual-class structures, once adopted, should
last forever” such that “corporate insiders maintain outsized control in perpetuity.”198 In the context of the present discussion, this
is a telling observation that emphasizes the exigency of the matter at hand.
From the above facts alone, it should be clear that concern
for dual-class sunsets have increased exponentially in recent
times.199 Notwithstanding these important developments, though,
it is fair to say that sunset provisions are still a long way from
becoming a dominant feature of DCS structures in general.200 Indeed, it is curious that almost half of companies listing on U.S.
stock markets over the past fifteen years with DCS adopted a perpetual DCS structure containing no sunset provision in any shape
or form.201 Admittedly, only 14% of dual-class IPOs carried out on
U.S. markets in 2017 had perpetual DCS structures, which—at
least on the face of things—suggests a notable drift from the former norm.202 However, any such conclusion is tempered by the
fact that only one-third of dual-class IPOs conducted in 2018 involved time-based sunset provisions, with the majority continuing
to be non-time-contingent.203
The somewhat truncated spread of sunsets to date is unsurprising. After all, there still exists considerable skepticism from
ISS 2019(1), supra note 25, at 6; see also Andrew W. Winden, Sunrise,
Sunset: An Empirical and Theoretical Assessment of Dual-Class Stock Structures, 2018 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 852, 857 (2018).
197 Jackson, supra note 1.
198 Id. (emphasis in original).
199 See supra notes 187–98 and accompanying text.
200 See Jackson, supra note 1.
201 See id.
202 See id.
203 See Sharfman, Sunsets, supra note 97, at 7 n.29.
196
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opponents of DCS as to whether sunset provisions will prove to
be the corporate governance panacea that they are frequently
held out as.204 In theory, a suitably designed sunset provision is
expected to strike an effective balance between, on the one hand,
upholding long-term managerial accountability, and, on the other
hand, mitigating short-term stock market pressures on management at critical points in the corporate life cycle.205 However,
striking this balance in practice is a considerably more difficult
governance task than it might first appear.206 Additionally, there
is the concern that, even to the extent stock market pricing
mechanisms are sensitive to firm-specific governance factors such
as the presence or absence of DCS, it is at least questionable
whether they are responsive to such granular and nuanced considerations as whether a given DCS structure is perpetual or sunsetting in nature.207 This is not to mention the separate (albeit
interrelated) issue of the precise nature of any sunset provision
that happens to be in place, which adds even further to the valuation complexities.208
Insofar as there exists doubt as to whether the presence (or,
conversely, absence) of a sunset provision within (or from) a given
DCS structure is likely to elicit a corresponding market pricing differential, it is unsurprising that many entrepreneurs and investors
embarking on a dual-class listing have been either reticent or ambivalent about adopting this particular DCS component.209 On the
other hand, the steadily growing take-up of sunset provisions
within recent dual-class listings suggests that a reasonable degree
of investor demand for such protections does indeed exist.210 In any
event, the complex, uncertain and fluctuating nature of this issue
today suggests that a degree of caution on the part of prospective

See Winden & Baker, supra note 24, at 8.
Eechambadi, supra note 160, at 531–32.
206 See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
207 See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 622–23.
208 On the questionability of stock market pricing of firm-specific corporate
governance characteristics, see generally supra notes 177–79 and accompanying text.
209 See Sharfman, supra note 4, at 19.
210 See id. at 2 n.6.
204
205
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market regulators would be salutary here.211 This is with a view
to preserving meaningful scope for private ordering at the individual firm level. Moreover, such a deferential (or “light-touch”)212
regulatory stance would appear exigent both on the more general
issue of whether DCS structures should be perpetual or sunsetting in nature, and, equally, with respect to the more specific
question of how best (if at all) to calibrate a suitable market-wide
regulatory requirement for sunset provision. Accordingly, it is to
the latter challenge that we now turn our attention.
II.THE THREE PRINCIPAL MODELS OF SUNSET PROVISION
A. The Time-Centered Sunset Model
Of the various structural forms of DCS sunset provision
that have been trialed, undoubtedly the most popular—on the
investor side at least—has been the time-centered model.213 In
essence, a time-based sunset provision is a bespoke charter or bylaw provision that causes a DCS company’s multi-voting shares
automatically to convert (or “sunset”) to single-vote shares after
the passing of a predetermined period of time, unless the company’s existing single-vote shareholders214 affirmatively resolve
otherwise by way of a majority class vote to this effect.215 At the
individual firm level, specific sunset time triggers can vary from a
See supra Section I.B.
On the effectiveness of so-called “soft” or “light-touch” financial regulation generally under appropriate circumstances (as viewed from a comparative
trans-Atlantic perspective), see Moore, supra note 179, at 101 n.28. See also
Ferran’s explanation:
The construction of a regulatory architecture relating to companies which is modern and suitable for a competitive economy
depends crucially on striking the right balance between giving
business the flexibility to operate effectively in dynamic and
internationally orientated markets and, at the same time, giving investors confidence that they are legally protected against
exploitation and underperformance by corporate management.
Eilis Ferran, Corporate Law, Codes and Social Norms—Finding the Right Regulatory Combination and Institutional Structure, 1 J. CORP. L. STUD. 381, 385 (2001).
213 Fisch & Solomon, supra note 9, at 1079, 1086.
214 Or, at least, those single-vote shareholders who have no material affiliation with the DCS holder. On this, see Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 618.
215 Id.
211
212
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low of three years in duration (such as in the case of EVO payments)
to a high of twenty years (for example Workday).216 Amongst other
notable examples, Groupon has a sunset trigger of five years from
IPO (which converted in 2016) and Fitbit has a twelve-year trigger (which will convert in 2027).217 Two leading academic champions of time-based sunsets, meanwhile, have suggested ten or
fifteen years as potentially appropriate trigger points for DCS
companies to adopt in this regard.218
Time-based sunset provisions have unquestionably increased in popularity in recent years.219 SEC filings from 2018
show that twenty-four U.S.-listed companies adopted time-based
sunset provisions within their respective charters or bylaws that
year.220 Moreover, no fewer than twenty-six percent of dual-class
IPOs carried out on U.S. markets in 2017 contained time-based
sunset clauses, with the mean sunset period having reportedly fallen
to 9.5 years that year from 10.3 years in 2016.221 Meanwhile, the
Council of Institutional Investors has recently endorsed time-based
sunsets as a “second best” option for newly listing companies, aside
the purported “first best” option of adopting one-share/one-vote
immediately from IPO.222 And, as remarked on above, the Council
has also petitioned the NYSE and NASDAQ to introduce mandatory listing rules requiring that any multi-vote shares automatically sunset after seven years or less.223 NASDAQ has
See DUAL-CLASS SHARES IN ASIA PACIFIC, supra note 33, at 58–59.
COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVS. (CII), TIME-BASED SUNSET APPROACHES
TO DUAL CLASS STOCK (Jul. 13, 2018), https://www.cii.org/files/2-14-18%20
Time-based%20Sunsets.pdf [https://perma.cc/BH3J-4EDR] [hereinafter CII
TIME-BASED SUNSET].
218 See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 626.
219 See id. at 618.
220 CII TIME-BASED SUNSET, supra note 217.
221 CII DUAL-CLASS IPO, supra note 3.
222 See Dual Class Stock, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVS., https://www.cii
.org/dualclass_stock [https://perma.cc/2KJN-KCEN].
223 Id. Although, in a moderate concession to firm-specific flexibility, the
Council has further proposed in its recommendation to the exchanges that any
multi-class issuer’s initial sunset term should be extendable by one single further seven-year term, which would be conditional on the vote of a majority of
ordinary (that is non-multiple-voting) shareholders to this effect. See Ken Bertsch,
Amy Borrus & Jeff Mahoney, Petition to NYSE on Multiclass Sunset Provisions,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Nov. 2, 2018), https://
216
217
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predictably been resistant to this proposal, presumably in the
belief that it will undermine its attractiveness as a listing venue
for innovative hi-tech firms.224 However, the NYSE has shown a
tentative willingness at least to consider the CII’s request, although
at the time of writing no changes to its rules have consequently
been proposed.225
Advocates of time-based sunsets typically point to empirical
evidence which avers that, whereas U.S.-listed companies with
perpetual and sunsetting DCS structures exhibit similar IPO
valuations, over the longer term those with a perpetual DCS structure tend to exhibit significantly lower equity valuations than
those with some form of built-in sunset.226 One suggested reason
for this delayed disparity in valuations is the tendency of DCS
structures to “lock in” founder control, in the sense of insulating
founding entrepreneurs (who are typically the holders of multivote shares) from subsequent challenge to their incumbency
emanating from the market for control.227 This is because a corporate founder whose multi-vote shares enable her to retain majority (or even near-majority) voting control after IPO simply cannot unilaterally be displaced from her controlling position by way
of hostile tender offer or proxy contest, whether at the instigation
of a competitor firm, private equity fund or activist investor.228
The outcome of this, as DCS critics would seek to portray it, is an
effective corporate dictatorship whereby the continuing fortunes
of outside investors (typically holding only minority single-vote
shares) are left at the whim of overbearing and unpredictable controllers, to whom shareholder value creation may well have become a secondary consideration at best.229
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/11/02/petition-to-nyse-on-multiclass-sunset-provi
sions/ [https://perma.cc/U87Y-KTBZ].
224 Coffee, supra note 6.
225 Id.
226 See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 1.
227 See DUAL-CLASS SHARES IN ASIA PACIFIC, supra note 33, at 10.
228 See id. at 2.
229 Advocates of time-based sunsets have highlighted the high-profile example of Sumner Redstone, who indirectly retains a minority controlling stake
(via multiple-vote stock) in ViacomCBS Inc. despite being of limited mental
capacity due to dementia and memory loss. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra
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The harmful economic effects of manifest controller unaccountability in DCS companies are said to be particularly pronounced
in the very high technology industries where DCS structures tend
to be most commonly observed in practice.230 The purported danger
is that in such dynamic and fast-changing product market sectors,
once successful ideas can very quickly become outmoded.231 In turn,
initially successful startups can rapidly stagnate in the absence
of a constant flow of fresh ideas and challenges to established business strategies.232 Relatedly, whereas a relatively young company at
the typically volatile post-IPO stage might arguably benefit from
the strong and insulated leadership that a DCS structure permits,
this is unlikely to be the case once that company matures further
down the line, at which point controller unaccountability will arguably become a more elevated concern for investors.233
It is noteworthy that those commentators who take a less
sanguine view of the supposed general merits of time-based sunsets
tend to be hostile not to the time-centered sunset model itself, but
rather only to the notion that it should be enforced as a universal
note 12, at 587–89. See generally Elizabeth Winkler, Can Super-Voting Stocks
Survive the CBS Challenge?, WALL ST. J. (May 15, 2018). Although the significant legal and corporate governance ramifications of the prolonged Redstone/Viacom affair are undeniable, it must nonetheless be acknowledged that this is a
truly extraordinary scenario which is unlikely to recur in future with any degree
of frequency. Moreover, the relevant companies’ continuing combined market
capitalization of approximately $25 billion arguably puts recent events into
context to some extent. See Claire Atkinson, CBS and Viacom Merge to Form
$30 Billion Media Company, NBC NEWS (Aug. 13, 2019, 2:12 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/cbs-viacom-merge-form-30
-billion-media-company-n1041306 [https://perma.cc/5VH4-2KZ3]. Accordingly, in
the present author’s belief it would be overly hasty to ground a case for general
regulatory restriction of DCS usage on the experience of this peculiar episode
alone.
230 See DUAL-CLASS SHARES IN ASIA PACIFIC, supra note 33, at 34.
231 Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 589.
232 See id. at 589, 605.
233 Id. at 612. Bebchuk and Kastiel explain that “as time passes from the
IPO, there is a growing risk that a dual-class structure will become value decreasing and that public investors will find themselves subject to an inefficient
structure with significant governance risks and costs.” Id. at 630. In the authors’ belief, it therefore follows that “even those who believe that dual-class
structures are often efficient at the time of the IPO, and the period following
it, should have substantial concerns about dual-class structures that provide
perpetual or lifetime control.” Id.
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regulatory norm.234 However, critics of mandated time-based sunsets typically have no objection, but contrarily, tend to be favorably
disposed to the idea of such provisions being introduced on an ad hoc
basis via firm-specific private ordering.235 Their essential contention,
thus, is not that time-based sunsets are inherently problematic
from a corporate governance or business performance standpoint.236
Rather, it is simply that for stock exchanges or other regulatory
authorities to deny individual issuers the free choice in this regard
is a paternalistic intrusion on the contractual freedom of their investors and managers, who should arguably be at liberty to determine this complex matter subjectively in accordance with their
own prudential and practical judgment,237 whether at IPO stage
or thereafter.238
For example, Sharfman contends that while “the inclusion of a timebased sunset provision makes some sense ... to come to the conclusion that they
must be mandatory in every single dual class share structure one must go farther and rebut the strong presumption that private ordering is value enhancing for shareholders.” Sharfman, Sunsets, supra note 97, at 6. Sharfman claims
that “[t]o rebut this presumption, strong evidence of some sort of irrationality
or market failure must be found when market participants refuse to include
time-based sunset provisions in IPOs ... [and] such evidence does not exist.” Id.
235 Sharfman asserts that “[i]n sum, private ordering creates a strong presumption that the absence of time-based sunset provisions in many dual-class
share structures is value enhancing and should not be interfered with by regulatory authorities.” Id. at 3.
236 See id. at 10.
237 As Mitts vividly puts it:
Founders were paid by investors for the chance to bet on the
next great American success story. On that view, the Council
of Institutional Investors’ proposal that super-voting rights on
dual class stock expire within at least seven years is a misguided interference with a healthy form of private ordering.
Joshua Mitts, Why Investors Pay So Much for Dual-Class Firms, COLUM. L. SCH.
BLUE SKY BLOG (Jan. 2, 2019), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2019/01/02
/why-investors-pay-so-much-for-dual-class-firms/ [https://perma.cc/VX7X-QTQT].
238 As against this claim, though, Fisch and Solomon caution that “[t]o the
extent that market forces are not sufficient to enable public shareholders to evaluate
and price sunset provisions accurately at the IPO stage, it is unclear why their
ability to do so midstream will be superior.” Fisch & Solomon, supra note 9, at
1085. Accordingly, they conclude that “the theory that public shareholders can
properly evaluate whether to retain dual class at the time of the retention vote
seems inconsistent with the basic premise of the dual class structure.” Id.
234
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B. The Ownership-Centered Sunset Model
While the time-centered sunset model would appear to have
garnered the greatest share of support lately within the academic
and investor communities,239 it is by no means the only available
blueprint for DCS sunset design.240 Rather, there are two other
common structural forms of sunset provision that likewise merit
analysis here, namely the ownership-centered model241 and the
transfer-centered model.242
The former of those alternative models is part of a broader and
more general category of sunset provisions known as “event-based”
sunsets.243 As its title suggests, the essence of an event-based sunset is that it triggers on the occurrence of a particular event or
development, irrespective of the specific point in time at which
that event takes place.244 While event-based sunsets tend to lack
the simplicity and uniformity of time-based structures, their relative complexity and malleability mean that they are capable of
providing more tailored and circumstantially sensitive triggers
than their time-centered counterparts.245
In its more complex or nuanced forms, an event-based sunset
trigger could be designed by reference to a particular financial
performance outcome of the relevant firm, such that any multivote shares convert automatically to single-vote shares (unless independently resolved otherwise) upon that firm transgressing a
pre-specified negative performance threshold. The threshold for a
performance-related sunset trigger could potentially be stipulated
as a given level of earnings, sales or share price performance, meaning that if the firm drops below this “floor” the multi-vote holder(s)
automatically forfeits her formerly privileged governance status. Alternatively, an event-based sunset could be designed so that it is
triggered by the commission (or, in practice, revelation) of some
form of impropriety on the part of the firm’s multi-vote-holding
Id. at 1079, 1086.
See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 618.
241 See generally id. at 620.
242 See generally DUAL-CLASS SHARES IN ASIA PACIFIC, supra note 33, at 60.
243 See id. at 69–71.
244 Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 619. Although if an event-based trigger
is combined with a time-based trigger as part of a more complex dual-activated
sunset, then timing considerations will of course be highly relevant in that case.
245 See Fisch & Solomon, supra note 9, at 1086.
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controller, which could vary from a criminal felony to any detected
incidence of fraud, self-dealing or breach of fiduciary duty generally.246 The advantage of such event-based triggers is that they
render the multi-vote holder’s continuing enjoyment of her privileged governance status expressly conditional on her continuing
regard (or, at least, absence of manifest disregard) for business
performance and minority shareholder welfare. This can be contrasted favorably with the proverbial governance “blank check” that
a perpetual DCS structure would appear to hand to unscrupulous
or underperforming corporate controllers.247
In a broadly similar vein to the above types of provision,
ownership-based sunsets take effect on a multi-vote-holder’s cash
flow interest in the firm dropping below a certain floor level, as specified typically in terms of a given percentage of the firm’s aggregate
market capitalization (for example, 10% or 15%).248 The rationale
underpinning ownership-based sunsets is that multi-vote-holding
controllers should at all times have meaningful “skin in the game”:
that is to say, a sufficiently high level of personal exposure to the
firm’s ongoing economic fortunes to keep their interests broadly
aligned with those of (single-vote-holding) minority shareholders.249
Conversely, the above “skin in the game” requirement is geared
to mitigating the so-called “wedge”250 between a controller’s cash
flow and corresponding voting rights that a DCS structure is said
to engender, along with the associated agency costs that are arguably inflicted on the firm’s outside investors as a result.251
Ownership-based sunsets have not only proved appealing
to investors at the individual firm level lately but have also been
influential within the global financial-regulatory domain.252 For
instance, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange’s recently liberalized
listing rules now permit DCS structures subject (inter alia) to the
continuing requirement that DCS holders, collectively, maintain
at least a 10% underlying economic interest in the company’s

Winden, supra note 196, at 926–27.
See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 604.
248 Id. at 620.
249 Id.
250 This term is attributable to Sharfman, supra note 4, at 6.
251 Fisch & Solomon, supra note 9, at 1086.
252 See HKEX, supra note 36, at 13.
246
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equity.253 This is expressly with a view to ensuring “that, at the time
of listing, the economic interest in the company held by all [DCS]
beneficiaries, as a group, is large enough, in dollar terms, to align
their interests to some extent with those of other shareholders.”254
However, this general rule is subject to potential relaxation in the
case of especially large-scale issuers,255 where the Exchange deems
the DCS holder’s lower percentage holding to still constitute “a very
large amount in absolute dollar terms.”256
In order to have any meaningful “bite,” an ownership-based
sunset threshold must be set at a sufficiently high level.257 Otherwise, the sunset provision risks being rendered superfluous on the
premise that, should the multi-vote-holders’ proportionate equity
interest in the firm drop below that level, their controlling interest
will be negated in any event irrespective of the sunset’s presence.258
Unfortunately, as was demonstrated most pertinently in the case of
Lyft’s 2019 dual-class IPO, this is very much a live issue with
ownership-based sunsets.259 Consequently, there is cause to question the practical effectiveness of such provisions, at least pending
the formation of certain generally agreed market and/or regulatory norms as to what constitutes a materially significant level of
economic exposure for corporate controllers.260
C. The Transfer-Centered Sunset Model
The third main structural form of sunset provision, namely
the transfer-centered model, is also the least restrictive one from
the perspective of a DCS company’s controllers.261 This is because,
unlike the time- and ownership-centered models, it does not impose any restrictions on controllers for as long as they retain
Id.
Id.
255 This category includes (inter alia) any issuer with a market capitalization in excess of HK$80 billion. Id.
256 Id.
257 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Perils of Small-Minority Controllers, 107 GEO L. J. 1453, 1459 (2019) [hereinafter Bebchuk & Kastiel, Perils].
258 See Bebchuk & Kastiel, Lyft, supra note 60.
259 See id.
260 See Bebchuk & Kastiel, Perils, supra note 257, at 1457.
261 See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 620.
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ownership of their multiple-vote shares.262 The only constraint on
a controller’s behavior arising from such a structure concerns her
freedom to dispose of her shares either on death or retirement
from the business, that is, at least on terms that guarantee the
transferee the same voting entitlements previously enjoyed by the
transferor.263
The rationale behind a transfer-based sunset is that it
protects the legitimate expectations of a DCS company’s (singlevote-holding) minority shareholders, who may well have assented
to their subordinate governance status in the firm based on their
faith and/or trust in its incumbent (multi-vote-holding) controller.264 It follows that, where the identity of the controller changes
in one or other of the above instances, minority shareholders in
effect endure a fundamental rewriting of their implicit governance contract with the firm in the absence of any corresponding
compensation.
Admittedly, where the transferee is an independent purchaser
of the relevant shares in an arm’s length commercial transaction,
there is at least the a priori assurance for minority shareholders
that—since the new controller has purchased those shares for fair
market value—she at least has a rational incentive to ensure that
that value is preserved (and preferably enhanced) in the future.265
However, where the transferee has acquired the previous controller’s shares unilaterally by way of familial inheritance, such a
prudential motivation on the new controller’s part cannot readily
be inferred, not to mention the separate issue as to whether
that person has the requisite entrepreneurial acumen to take the
business forward successfully.266 It is in these latter circumstances that there is a risk of the so-called “idiot heir”267 problem
arising.
The “idiot heir” phenomenon denotes situations where the
offspring, spouse or other familial successor of a corporate
See id. at 620–21.
See id.
264 See id. at 609, 620.
265 See id.
266 See id. at 605
267 This term is attributable to Bebchuk & Kastiel, id.
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founder acquires control over the firm via inheritance, but without
possessing the same degree of entrepreneurial acumen, integrity
and/or motivation as their predecessor.268 In a non-DCS company
with a uniform share voting structure, there is at least the background assurance that where the relevant firm’s value is consequently reduced to a sufficiently material level,269 the new controller(s) will become vulnerable to potential ouster by means of an
outside contest for control. However, where the relevant company
has a DCS structure in favor of the new controller(s), that person (or
group) has an effective power of veto over any attempted control
acquisition, thereby locking down the firm under their command
at the potential expense of its independent investors. Moreover,
where the DCS structure persists beyond the lifespan of the successor-controller herself, the “idiot heir” problem could potentially
even carry down through further familial generations, at least insofar as the firm stays out of bankruptcy.270
In acknowledgment of these potential collateral effects of
allowing DCS structures, the reformed (as of 2018) Singaporean
Listing Rules provide that multiple-vote shares (MVSs)—while now
generally permitted for SGX-listed companies—will automatically
convert into standard (single-vote) equity shares on either: (i) the
MVS holder ceasing to be a director whether as a result of death,
retirement or otherwise, or (ii) the original MVS holder transferring
Id. In this regard, Reddy reports how “numerous studies have shown that
controlling shareholder firms perform worse where control is in the hands of heirs
as opposed to the original founder.” See Reddy, supra note 60, at 37.
269 Indeed, in this regard, Bebchuk and Kastiel note the existence of “evidence
that companies run by descendants often underperform other family companies
that are managed by their founders or by hired external managers.” Bebchuk &
Kastiel, supra note 12, at 606.
270 As SEC Commissioner Robert Jackson vividly puts it:
[P]erpetual dual-class ownership—forever shares—don’t just
ask investors to trust a visionary founder. It asks them to trust
that founder’s kids. And their kids’ kids. And their grandkid’s
kids. (Some of whom may, or may not, be visionaries.) It raises the
prospect that control over our public companies, and ultimately
of Main Street’s retirement savings, will be forever held by a small,
elite group of corporate insiders—who will pass that power down
to their heirs.
Jackson, supra note 1 (emphasis in original).
268
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her shares to a new holder.271 The only exception to this rule applies
where the relevant company shareholders have affirmatively provided—by majority vote—for the continuation of the MVSs in any
of the above instances.272 However, to be effective the above disapplication vote must be carried out by way of an “enhanced voting
process” whereby all shares voted (whether single- or multiple-vote)
are recorded strictly on a one share/one vote basis for the purpose
of the resolution in question.273
The new (post-2017) Hong Kong listings regime likewise
requires the automatic conversion of MVSs into single-vote equity
shares on an MVS holder’s death, incapacity, retirement or removal
as a director of a DCS company, or on the transfer of the MVSs
(or, at least, the economic interest therein) to another person.274
In the U.S. listings environment, meanwhile, it is noteworthy that
Alphabet/Google’s “Class B” (in order words, multi-vote) stock is subject to a firm-specific sunset provision of a fundamentally equivalent
character to the above provisions.275 And, in a similar vein, Lyft’s
2019 dual-class IPO on NASDAQ involved a transfer-centered sunset provision with a specific succession-based trigger, which was
preferred over both a more general transfer-based trigger and a
time-based sunset.276

SGX Mainboard Rules, supra note 28.
Id. at (10)(f)(ii).
273 Id. at (10)(f). In addition, under new SGX Listing Rule 210(10)(d), all
MVSs in SGX-listed firms have their voting entitlement mandatorily capped
at ten votes per share at all times, irrespective of any contractual or constitutional
provision to the contrary. Id. at (10)(d).
274 HK LISTING RULES, RULE 8A.17–8A.22, https://www.hkex.com.hk/-/media
/HKEX-Market/Listing/Rules-and-Guidance/Listing-Rules-Contingency/Main
-Board-Listing-Rules/Equity-Securities/chapter_8a.pdf?la=en [https://perma
.cc/KWP3-9VZD]. See also HKEX, supra note 36, Appendix I, at I-6-7. In a similar
vein, the current (post-2008) Japanese listings regime requires the automatic
conversion of MVSs into single-vote shares on either the death of the original
MVS holder or the transfer of her shares to a third party. See Toshima, supra
note 71, at 44.
275 See Alphabet, Inc., supra note 35.
276 Sharfman, Sunsets, supra note 97, at 7. On this, see also Bebchuk &
Kastiel, Lyft, supra note 60.
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III.THE CASE IN FAVOR OF THE TRANSFER-CENTERED MODEL
From the preceding discussion, it should be apparent that
the issue of DCS sunset design is by no means a “one-size-fitsall”277 endeavor. On the contrary, there are in practice a variety
of general sunset models for investors, managers and (where
relevant) regulators which to choose.278 Furthermore, on a lower
level of granularity there are also a wide range of specific potential triggers within each of those models.279 As mentioned
above, the time-centered model is unquestionably the most popular one today (at least in the United States), not least on account
of the strong support that this model has garnered from influential investor-related bodies.280
The intuitive appeal of the time-centered model over the
principal alternative sunset paradigms is entirely understandable. As well as being relatively simple for corporate lawyers
to design, it is also comparatively costless for investors, proxy
advisors and regulators to implement and enforce, due to the
uniform and straightforward nature of the standard time
thresholds.281 However, as will be argued below, from a broader
social point of view the time-based model is—in certain respects—
the most problematic of the principal sunset models available,
whereas the transfer-centered model is the least problematic of
the three.282 This is for three main reasons, which shall be explained in turn below.283 These are: (i) the lesser degree of arbitrariness of the transfer-centered sunset model compared to the
time- and ownership-based models; (ii) the lesser danger of the
transfer-centered model giving rise to moral hazard and other perverse controller incentives, relative to the time-centered model at
least; and (iii) the unique sensitivity of the transfer-centered
The author’s usage of this term in the present context is attributable to
David Berger. See Berger, supra note 103, at 15.
278 See supra Part II; see also Fisch & Solomon, supra note 9, at 1086–91
(discussing alternative sunset provisions).
279 See id. at 1086 (describing several events that may trigger a sunset).
280 See supra Section II.A.
281 See Delaware Letter, supra note 195, at 7 n.16.
282 See infra Section III.A.
283 See infra Sections III.A–C.
277
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model to the powerful non-financial motivations of multiple-voteholding corporate founders.284
The third of the above considerations in particular suggests
that dogmatic adherence by academic commentators to the agency
cost rationale for time- and ownership-based sunsets is not only
unnecessary, but also potentially harmful to the long-term business performance of DCS companies.285 At the same time, this
Article will caution against necessarily embracing a “pure” private ordering approach to DCS sunset design, which some other
commentators have called for.286
A. Lesser Degree of Arbitrariness
It is submitted that the first key comparative advantage of
the transfer-centered model of sunset design is its lesser degree
of arbitrariness in comparison with the other two main models,
and especially the time-centered one.287 Indeed, it is in this regard
that the time-centered model’s key practical strength—namely its
relative simplicity and uniformity—also becomes its main weakness
by imposing a “bright-line” objective approach to what is, more often
than not, a matter of nuanced and subjective business judgment.288
The conversion of a DCS structure to a universal singlevote arrangement can have potentially profound implications, not
just for those investors who are immediately affected but also for
the relevant firm as a whole.289 In addition to effecting an automatic de facto wealth transfer from the controller(s) to minority
shareholders, it also has the collateral impact of intensifying the
outside capital market pressures acting on the controller(s) and her
managerial delegates, who are suddenly subjected to the potentially destabilizing pressures of the market for corporate control.290
Id.
See infra Section III.C.
286 See infra Section III.C.
287 See Fisch & Solomon, supra note 9, at 1081–82; see also Sharfman, Sunsets,
supra note 97, at 10.
288 See Fisch & Solomon, supra note 9, at 1062–63, 1080–82.
289 See Sharfman, Sunsets, supra note 97, at 9–10.
290 On the purportedly destabilizing effect of such pressures generally, see
STOUT, supra note 117, ch. 6; MAYER, supra note 119, at 89–116; Andrei Shleifer
284
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In a company whose controller—behind the notional capital market
buffer of a DCS structure—had previously been pursuing a strategic
course of action that was idiosyncratic291 and/or successful in an
oblique292 or inchoate way, the sudden imperative to communicate
that business model to an external capital market constituency
can be a galling task.293
The ensuing corporate culture shock may even necessitate
a consequent shift in the fundamental purpose of the business294
towards a more overtly shareholder value-oriented objective.295 Of
course, in some instances, exposing an incumbent management and
corporate culture to such external pressures can be a beneficial
way of reinvigorating an ailing or stagnant business, especially
where a founder’s vision and ideas have become outmoded as a
result of market, technological or other societal shifts.296 However, where a DCS sunset provision is activated prematurely,
such exposure can potentially be harmful for the firm (and, indirectly,
its general body of shareholders) by facilitating unwarranted interference by activist and institutional investors in a controller’s
implementation of her long-term strategic plan or vision.297
& Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers in CORPORATE
TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33–67 (Alan J. Auerbach ed. 1988);
Simon Deakin & Giles Slinger, Hostile Takeovers, Corporate Law and the Theory
of the Firm, 24 J.L. & SOC’Y 124 (1997).
291 On the potential economic value to the firm and its investors of idiosyncratic entrepreneurial vision, see generally Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 132.
292 On the potential economic value to the firm and its investors of oblique
or indirect (as opposed to instrumental or direct) methods of corporate profitmaking, see generally JOHN KAY, OBLIQUITY: WHY OUR GOALS ARE BEST
ACHIEVED INDIRECTLY 24–34 (2011).
293 On the communicative imperatives of capital markets vis-à-vis corporate
managers generally, see Moore & Walker-Arnott, supra note 13, at 432–37; FROUD
ET AL., supra note 133, ch. 5.
294 On the notion of corporate purpose generally as viewed from a legal perspective, see Christopher M. Bruner, Power and Purpose in the ‘Anglo-American’
Corporation, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 579, pt. II (2010); BARNALI CHOUDHURY & MARTIN
PETRIN, CORPORATE DUTIES TO THE PUBLIC ch. 3 (2019).
295 Berger, supra note 103.
296 On the propensity of corporate-managerial “insiders” to overvalue the
firm’s internal capital allocation plans, and the corresponding value of external
stock market signals as a potential means of correcting such overvaluations,
see Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States: Of
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1469–70 (2007).
297 On this, see supra notes 103–09 and accompanying text.
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The contention here is not that DCS sunsets, or indeed
DCS structures generally, are inherently “good” or “bad” in terms
of their overall economic efficiency or social utility. The point,
rather, is that there is no “one-size-fits-all” optimal time period
for DCS sunsets.298 On the contrary, determining an appropriate
sunset period for any DCS company is an inherently contextual
and firm-specific issue that eludes universal regulatory treatment.299 Accordingly, any micro-level equilibrium in this regard
is dependent on the nature of the relevant corporate controller(s),
business model, organizational culture, product market, technological environment, and/or point in the relevant business life
cycle.300 Indeed, typical corporate investment time horizons can
vary considerably both between and even within industrial
sectors, ranging from as short as three to five years in some sectors to as high as ten to fifteen in others.301 In respect of certain
radically innovative and technologically intensive initiatives, the
investment-to-return time frame can potentially even be much
higher.302
In view of the above, it becomes apparent that regulatory
requirements for fixed-term sunsets calibrated on anything wider
than a firm-specific basis are inherently arbitrary in nature.303
The CII’s abovementioned proposal for universal seven-year
sunsets is especially problematic in terms of arbitrariness given
its intended potential application to the U.S.-listed company
sector in its entirety.304 As Goshen points out, such a bright-line
Sharfman, Sunsets, supra note 97, at 10.
Fisch & Solomon, supra note 9, at 1063.
300 Govindarajan et al. claim that “a sunset clause would be ideal if there
exists a fixed, predetermined time after which all companies become mature
enough to need no further changes in their business models.” Govindarajan et
al., supra note 18. However, they point out that a company’s age-to-maturity
period typically “differs based on the firm’s technology and business model”
such that “a one-size-fits-all policy would not work.” See id.
301 HM TREASURY, FINANCING GROWTH IN INNOVATIVE FIRMS: CONSULTATION 10 (Aug. 2017), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/up
loads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/642456/financing_growth_in_inno
vative_firms_consultation_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/X83V-CQRD].
302 See id.
303 See Goshen, supra note 151.
304 See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
298
299
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rule seems predicated on the unrealistic notion that entrepreneurial vision can only be realized successfully during the first
seven years of a company’s post-IPO life, whereas in fact “there is
nothing in the company, or in life, suggesting that” to be the
case.305
Moreover, even firm-specific sunsets are not necessarily
immune from charges of arbitrariness in that, by their very
nature, they are designed proactively a number of years ahead of
their intended activation.306 As such, their formulation inevitably
takes place to some extent in the abstract, without knowledge or
foresight of the specific challenges facing the relevant firm’s
business at the (later) point in its life cycle when the relevant
sunset is activated.307 In this regard, Fisch and Solomon note that
in most current instances of time-based sunsets “the length of
the sunset period appears to be arbitrary and does not seem to
correlate with any theory about the length of time necessary for a
founder to implement his or her vision.”308 However, as the same
authors highlight, “[t]he timeframe necessary for realizing a
company’s goals is likely to vary depending on the company, based
on factors like the company’s maturity at the IPO stage, the
duration of its business model, and the time required to develop its
products or services and bring them to market.”309 Accordingly,
any sunset provision that is triggered by an ex ante time-contingent trigger—whether regulatory or firm-specific in nature—
inevitably runs the risk of cutting adversely against the grain of
the relevant firm’s business trajectory at the time of its eventual
activation.310
Given their more contingent and context-dependent nature,
ownership-based and other event-triggered sunsets are, in general,
less problematic than time-based sunsets in terms of their potential arbitrariness.311 However, even ownership-based triggers are susceptible to the same charge of eliciting crude and
Goshen, supra note 151.
See Fisch & Solomon, supra note 9, at 1080–81.
307 See id. at 1081.
308 Fisch & Solomon, supra note 9, at 1081.
309 Id. at 1082.
310 See id. at 1084.
311 See Fisch & Solomon, supra note 9, at 1086.
305
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factually insensitive outcomes.312 This risk is especially pertinent
where a corporate founder or other controlling shareholder may
have legitimate prudential motivations for wishing to liquidate
part of her multi-vote holding, for example to obtain enhanced
personal liquidity.313 In those instances, it is likely that the multivote holder will significantly reduce her proportionate cash flow
interest in the firm, irrespective of her continuing faith in and/or
commitment to the firm’s success.314 As such, the increased wedge
consequently arising between her voting and corresponding cash
flow rights in the firm should not be presumed to denote a case of
the proverbial captain fleeing her sinking ship, as an agency-costcentered interpretation of the same scenario would typically
suggest.315 For this reason, an ownership-based sunset trigger
can prove a potential curb on an incumbent multi-vote holder’s
personal financial flexibility, which can in turn increase the relevant firm’s cost of raising fresh equity capital from prospective
future controllers.316
Compared to the time and ownership-centered sunset
models, the transfer-centered model is less susceptible to allegations of harmful arbitrariness.317 This is for two main reasons.
First, since a transfer-based sunset will only be triggered by the
death or retirement (as a director) of the multi-vote holder(s), or
the sale of her equity stake, there is consequently no risk of a
transfer-based trigger being activated during the period of an incumbent controller’s premiership.318 This insures against the risk
of disturbance to the firm’s pre-existing business trajectory.319
And, second, since a transfer of corporate control (whether by way
of succession or sale/purchase) inevitably entails a sudden change
of trajectory for the firm’s business (whether strategically or at
See id.
See Marc Moore, Designing Dual Class Sunsets: The Case for a TransferCentered Approach, COLUM. L. SCH. BLUE SKY BLOG (Dec. 19, 2019), https://cls
bluesky.law.columbia.edu/2019/12/19/designing-dual-class-sunsets-the-case-for
-a-transfer-centered-approach/ [https://perma.cc/PK7Z-65HZ].
314 See id.
315 See Fisch & Solomon, supra note 9, at 1086.
316 See Moore, supra note 313.
317 See id.
318 Id.
319 Id.
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least culturally), in any event, it follows that conversion of the
firm’s capital structure at this point in time will not in itself be a
likely cause of organizational destabilization.320
Accordingly, the transfer-centered model would appear the
preferable option from the above perspective.321
B. Avoidance of Moral Hazard and Other Perverse Controller
Incentives
In addition to their alleged arbitrariness, time-based sunsets
are also susceptible to criticism on account of their purportedly
perverse behavioral effects.322 This is because a time-based sunset—
whether prompted by regulation or private ordering—arguably
creates an artificial incentive on the part of an incumbent controller
to dispose of her DCS holding at some point within the specified
pre-sunset period.323 By doing so, the controller will expectedly be
able to recoup as much of her remaining control premium as possible before it dissipates on the triggering of the applicable sunset
deadline.324 As Coffee has noted, this could have the unintended
consequence of engendering greater industry concentration by encouraging dynamic start-up founders to sell their multi-vote stakes
to established market leaders some time before the expiry of their
privileged governance status.325 In turn, the above trend could have
the long-term effect of creating what Coffee has termed a “permanent
gerontocracy”,326 which presumably denotes a heavily concentrated
See Fisch & Solomon, supra note 9, at 1088.
See generally id. at 1088–89.
322 See id. at 1083.
323 See id. at 1083.
324 See id. Although, as Fisch and Solomon have highlighted, in principle such
differential pricing of multi-vote vis-a-vis single-vote stakes could be eliminated
by inserting an equal treatment provision in the relevant company’s charter,
which would in effect compel the controller to sell her (controlling) multi-vote stake
at the same per-share price as any (non-controlling) single-vote stake(s). Id. at
1089. However, whether the relevant multi-vote holder would be prepared to assent to such a wealth-reducing condition in practice is questionable, at least
without demanding some corresponding compensation in the form of a higher
upfront cost of capital and/or offsetting side benefits (e.g., an increased executive salary). See Kirby Smith, The Agency Costs of Equal Treatment Clauses,
127 YALE L.J. FORUM 543, 561 (2017).
325 Coffee, supra note 6, at 2.
326 Id.
320
321
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corporate sector dominated by a small group of large, mature, and
clunky market leaders.327
Of course, insofar as conversion of the multi-vote shares to
common (single vote) stock takes place automatically on the
triggering of the relevant sunset provision, it follows that acquisition of the (controlling) multi-vote stake will not in itself
guarantee the acquirer long-term corporate control.328 Accordingly, the extent of the price differential attaching to the multi-vote
dimension of a DCS structure will tend to reduce progressively
towards zero as the pre-specified sunset date nears.329 However,
even then, there is still a significant moral hazard risk with a
time-based sunset, which can consequently compel the multi-vote
holder in this position—faced with the known prospect of imminent loss of control—to engage in short-term, excessively risky
and/or self-serving behavior in order to maximize her own personal wealth prior to the inevitable “cliff edge”330 of the predetermined sunset deadline arriving.331
In response to the above criticism of time-based sunsets,
Bebchuk and Kastiel point out that, with a provision in the form
recently proposed by the CII, the termination of the relevant
DCS structure after the specified time period is not a necessary
consequence.332 Rather, as explained above, under the CII-backed
model, minority (single-vote) shareholders can always opt to
Although Coffee himself does not offer an explicit definition of this term
in the present context, the Oxford/Lexio dictionary defines the word “gerontocracy”
in its more generic (i.e., non-corporate-specific) sense as denoting “a state, society
or group governed by old people”. Gerontocracy, LEXIO, https://www.lexico.com
/en/definition/gerontocracy [https://perma.cc/E57V-PMUD].
328 See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 611.
329 See id.
330 Fisch & Solomon, supra note 9, at 1083.
331 Id. Admittedly, it could be queried why the other two dominant types of
sunset provisions examined in this article are not prone to have the same perverse incentive effects on corporate controllers. See generally id. at 1086–91.
However, it is submitted that in the case of ownership, transfer, and other
event-based sunsets, the elements of contingency and resulting indeterminacy
involved in triggering the relevant DCS conversion provision mean that such
sunsets typically do not have the same cliff-edged nature as ex ante time-based
sunsets. See id. at 1083, 1086. It is therefore arguable that the risk of incumbent
controllers engaging in “last shot” reckless or rent-seeking behavior is, in general, a less exigent corporate governance concern in those latter instances.
332 See NASDAQ Letter, supra note 195.
327
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retain the DCS structure after the initial (e.g., seven-year) sunset
period by means of an affirmative independent vote to this effect.333
This theoretically caters to instances where a DCS structure continues to prove advantageous for the firm and its investors, by
enabling voluntary deactivation (or, at least, suspension) of the
sunset trigger by minority shareholders.334 However, the argument that the cliff-edged nature of time-based sunsets—together
with their consequent adverse behavioral influence on controllers—
are effectively neutralized by the procedural stopgap of an independent shareholder vote on the matter is a highly problematic
one.335 This is for two main reasons.
First, it fails to account for the significance of the time-based
sunset’s default status under the CII’s model and, relatedly, the
fact that any independent shareholder vote on postponement of
the sunset’s triggering must be proposed by way of a proactive
minority shareholder resolution to this effect.336 If that significant
hurdle is passed, there remains the additional challenge of securing
a majority independent shareholder vote to this effect, which, in
the public company environment, can be a galling corporate governance task for even the most active and committed of investors.337 Against the background of these significant communication
Id.
Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 624.
335 See Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93
AEA PAPERS & PROC. 175, 176 (2003).
336 In this regard, Thaler and Sunstein have highlighted how selecting a
“default option” is in practice never a value-neutral decision for policymakers,
but in reality has an inevitable paternalistic or welfarist element to it. Id. The
authors explain that “[i]n a fully rational world such design choices would have
little effect (at least in high-stakes situations) because agents would simply
choose the best option for them regardless of the default.” Id. However, as against
this, they observe how “numerous experiments illustrate that there is a very strong
‘status quo’ bias [in practice]” whereby “[t]he existing arrangement, whether set
out by private institutions or by government, tends to stick.” Id. For an extended and more generic (i.e., non-corporate-specific) argument to this effect by
the same authors, see generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH AND HAPPINESS (2008).
337 This factor is especially concerning given Berger’s recent observation
that “the most striking empirical studies these days are those showing that the
traditional measures of ‘good corporate governance’ have little relationship to
either corporate performance or ethical corporate behavior.” Berger, supra note
103, at 15. Rather, “all that is measured by corporate governance studies is
333
334
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and coordination difficulties, it becomes clear that the default status
of an automatic time-based sunset is far from a trivial matter.338
On the contrary, it matters a great deal in weighing the conversion
versus postponement question firmly in favor of the former outcome, which is therefore likely to ensue in all but the most manifestly inappropriate cases.339 Even in those instances, though, it is
debatable whether the arguments in favor of postponement will
be sufficiently compelling in the eyes of non-controlling investors
to bring about the circumvention of a time-based sunset’s automatic activation.340
whether a company meets the current ‘checklist’ of various governance metrics,
which again have little to do with performance or ethics.” Id. On the common
investor and intermediary practice of corporate governance “box-checking”
generally (albeit with principal reference to the United Kingdom, rather than
the United States, securities market context), see generally Moore, supra note
179, at 117–25; supra note 212 and accompanying text; Bobby V. Reddy, Thinking Outside the Box—Eliminating the Perniciousness of Box-Ticking in the New
Corporate Governance Code, 82 MOD. L. REV. 692 (2019).
338 On status quo bias generally, see generally William Samuelson & Richard
Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988).
339 On one view, setting a one share/one vote default norm for former DCS
companies after seven years could be regarded as an example of what Ayres and
Gertner have termed a “penalty default” rule, which is deliberately set in favor
of the less informed party (i.e., non-controlling shareholders) so as to give the
more informed party (i.e., the founder and/or controlling shareholder) the incentive to reveal greater information to the other party (e.g., as to their future
strategic plans for the company) as a precondition of securing their support for
reversing the relevant default (i.e., for reintroducing a DCS structure). Ian Ayres
& Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory
of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 97–100 (1989). However, it is questionable to what
extent non-controlling shareholders can actually be regarded as relatively less
well-informed on corporate governance issues within the contemporary U.S.
capital market environment, where institutional investors, proxy advisors and
other specialized professional intermediaries now customarily exert a pervasive influence over key corporate governance norm selections and adaptations
at the individual firm level. Christie Hayne & Marshall D. Vance, Information
Intermediary or De Facto Standard Setter?: Field Evidence on the Indirect and
Direct Influence of Proxy Advisors, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Mar. 20,
2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/03/20/information-intermediary-or-de
facto-standard-setter-field-evidence-on-the-indirect-and-direct-influence-of-proxy
-advisors/ [https://perma.cc/U45R-78RF].
340 In view of the above factors, it would arguably be more appropriate for
securities market regulators to set the retention of the DCS structure after the
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A second reason for doubting the effectiveness of independent
shareholder sunset postponement votes is the inherent conflict of
interest that non-controlling, single-vote shareholders will be
faced with in this scenario.341 When voting on the sensitive conversion versus postponement question with respect to a given
company’s DCS structure, single-vote shareholders will be acting
in the knowledge that they stand to gain directly from the removal of
the multi-vote holder’s control premium via DCS conversion.342
Vice versa, on conversion of the DCS structure to a uniform one
share/one vote platform, the single-vote shareholders’ corresponding minority discount will automatically be offset.343 The prospect
of reaping this immediate personal wealth gain will make it highly
difficult, if not outright impossible, for the single-vote shareholders to give genuinely impartial consideration to the question of
which voting arrangement is in the long-term interest of the company and its investor body as a whole.344 The existence of this
manifest conflict on the part of single-vote shareholders arguably
further strengthens the case for weighing the conversion versus
postponement decision on the side of the latter outcome, by setting
the retention of the existing DCS structure as the reversible-default
initial sunset period (e.g., seven years) as the default norm, while vesting independent (single-vote) shareholders with the right to propose and vote on converting the super-voting shares to single-vote shares. See generally Ayres &
Gertner, supra note 339; Hayne & Vance, supra note 339. By inverting the
abovementioned CII-backed reform in this way, regulators may well strike a
more efficient balance between encouraging the take-up of time-based sunsets
by listed DCS companies and preventing independent shareholders from being
swayed by status quo bias into systematically favoring DCS conversion on the
expiration of the initial sunset period. See generally Govindarajan et al., supra
note 18. At the same time, activist and institutional investors will still have the
right to propose conversion resolutions in appropriate instances, especially where
those proposals attract additional support from proxy advisors and other influential pro minority-shareholder groups. See NASDAQ Letter, supra note 195.
On the relevant CII proposal in its existing form, and related discussion, see
generally Council of Institutional Invs., supra notes 193–95.
341 See Fisch & Solomon, supra note 9, at 1084.
342 Id.
343 See William J. Piercy, For What It’s Worth ... Court Rejects Minority Discount in Valuing Stock, BERMAN FINK VAN HORN P.C. BLOGS (May 21, 2018),
https://www.bfvlaw.com/for-what-its-worth-court-rejects-minority-discount-in
-valuing-stock/ [https://perma.cc/9TTS-DC75].
344 Fisch & Solomon, supra note 9, at 1084–85.
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outcome of time-based sunsets (to the extent, of course, that it is seen
as prudent to mandate or even deploy such provisions for DCS
companies generally).345
For the above reasons, it is therefore unlikely that the availability of an independent shareholder postponement vote will be
effective in mitigating the moral hazard and other unintended behavioral consequences that time-based (and, to a lesser extent,
ownership-based) sunsets are liable to give rise to.346 It consequently pays to consider other less obtuse or intrusive ways of
designing sunset triggers, especially if any such provision is intended as a blueprint for prospective future regulatory reforms.
C. Sensitivity to Non-Financial Controller Motivations
At the heart of the academic case for time-based (and, by implication, ownership-based) sunsets is the abovementioned “wedge”347
issue: that is to say, the disparity that can develop between a multivote holder’s governance and cash flow rights in a DCS company, and
the ensuing agency problems that this mismatch is said to create.348
Accordingly, purely transfer-based sunsets that are triggered
only by the death or retirement of corporate founders are said to
be insufficiently responsive to developing agency cost issues in
founder-controlled DCS firms.349
For example, Bebchuk and Kastiel question the effectiveness of succession-triggered sunsets that permit DCS structures
to endure throughout a multi-vote holder’s life (or, at least, for the
length of her ownership or directorial tenure).350 This is on the
In this regard, Sharfman explains that since,
[s]hareholders suffer from the problems of asymmetric information
and the simple inability to make the proper evaluation of a leader’s
idiosyncratic vision [they are consequently left] in the position
of having the knowledge that ending the dual class share structure will expose the shares to the market for corporate control
and hedge fund activism, an expected positive for the company’s share price, without being able to evaluate the cost.
Sharfman, Sunsets, supra note 97, at 9–10.
346 Id.
347 Id. at 7.
348 See id. at 9–10.
349 See Winden, supra note 196, at 894.
350 Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 619.
345
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purported premise that “[a] founder who has decades of working
life ahead of her poses substantial risks that she would not remain
a fitting leader of the company throughout her entire working life.”351
The authors consequently conclude that such arrangements are
“substantially inferior” from an agency cost perspective than
shorter-term time-based sunset provisions.352
In a similar vein, Goshen and Hamdani claim that, because
multi-vote holders—as effective minority controllers—have a
lesser proportion of residual cash flow rights at risk than controlling majority shareholders in single-class stock companies, it follows
that independent investors are likely to face greater exposure to
controller agency costs in firms with DCS structures.353 They argue that, in contrast, “the concentrated-ownership structure allows [a controlling majority shareholder] to enjoy indefinite and
uncontestable control without subjecting investors to the high
management agency costs associated with the dual-class structure.”354 In forming such a favorable impression of orthodox majority control structures over their minority control (e.g., DCS)
counterparts, Goshen and Hamdani proceed on the express assumption that “[t]he higher the controller’s share of cash-flow
rights, the lower her incentive to expropriate the minority.”355 In
this regard, they refer to the perceived “lock-in” effect of orthodox
controlling shareholdings, which are typically illiquid in nature
due to their relatively large scale, coupled with the significant
concentration of firm-specific risk that they tend to entail.356 As
such, majority control stakes in large business organizations are
normally unsusceptible to ready disposal, and consequently do not
permit their holder a frictionless exit from her position at any desired moment in time.357 A notable implication of Goshen and
Hamdani’s analysis is that DCS and other minority control structures—correspondingly—do not have such a lock-in effect on a
Id. at 620.
Id.
353 Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 132, at 590–91.
354 Id. at 593.
355 Id. at 591.
356 Id. at 593.
357 Id.
351
352
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multi-vote-holder’s position in the firm.358 As such, they purportedly fail to restrict a multi-vote-holder’s capacity “to quickly walk
away from the business,”359 thereby undermining the propensity of
entrepreneurial controllers to commit to ensuring DCS companies’ long-term development and success (in preference to expropriating private benefits of control).360
However, while controller alienation and/or rent extraction
in DCS companies might seem likely when viewed from a purely
agency cost-oriented perspective, on a broader and more nuanced
analysis such concerns would appear to be significantly overstated.361 It is submitted that the principal blind spot of orthodox
agency cost analyses of DCS structures is their tendency to overlook the overall calculus of financial and non-financial costs of
private (and especially founder) control, by regarding only the former type of cost as an effective constraint on entrepreneurial wealth
extraction.362 Thus the presumptive starting point of the agency cost
view is that without some meaningful element of “skin in the
game” in the form of personal financial risk exposure, controllers
of DCS companies stand to lose relatively little from abandonment and/or misuse of their privileged governance position within
the firm.363
What the above problematization of DCS fails to recognize, though, is the practical reality that multi-vote-holding
controllers—and especially founder-entrepreneurs—have considerably more at stake in the firm than just their basic financial
equity.364 Of comparable personal significance for an entrepreneur are the crucial non-financial personal consequences of the
failure or underperformance of a business enterprise that she
See id.
Id.
360 See id. at 593–94.
361 See Lemley & McCreary, supra note 137, at 23.
362 In this regard, it has recently been highlighted that since “firms that go
public are commonly controlled by founders, and going public in any case rewards
founders who care about non-pecuniary factors (control, public prominence, etc.)
rather than profit maximization,” it follows that “[w]ithout such founder control and non-financial motivations, the go-public rate might be lower still.” Id.
363 See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 620.
364 Melissa S. Cardon et al., The Nature and Experience of Entrepreneurial
Passion, 34 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 511, 512–14, 517, 521 (2009).
358
359
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has founded and invested her time, energy, and creativity in, including the loss of valuable reputational capital amongst peers
and associates.365
It has been observed how reputational constraints on
minority controller rent-seeking can be especially compelling in
family controlled firms,366 given the status of families as effective
“repositories for reputation.”367 In addition, there is the common
personal interest of founder-entrepreneurs in maintaining firm
growth for the benefit of subsequent familial generations, which
provides a further powerful motivation to limit their exploitation
of private benefits of control on an ongoing basis.368 Reputational
incentives for responsible (or, at the very least, non-exploitative)
controller conduct in DCS companies are arguably further intensified in instances where a minority controller envisages
issuing additional nonvoting or restricted voting stock in the
future, which creates an imperative to keep the external capital
market onside.369 The above considerations together support a
general presumption that family controlled firms—or, at least those
family firms at the first generation (founder) stage—will be
managed in a broadly diligent and responsible manner without
the systematic exploitation of private benefits of control, notwithstanding the existence of a significant wedge between the
founder-entrepreneur’s voting and corresponding cash flow rights
in the firm. Or, at the very least, they imply that adoption of such
a default starting point is not as naïve or misguided a position
as agency cost analyses of minority control structures would tend
to suggest.
With respect to entrepreneurial motivation more generally,370
meanwhile, psychological research has highlighted the centricity
to entrepreneurship (based on an analogy with parenthood) of
entrepreneurial passion, and a founder-entrepreneur’s typically strong sense of attachment to and identification with their
Id. at 513, 521, 527.
See BEBCHUK ET AL., supra note 56, at 305–06.
367 Id. at 306. See generally Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership
Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999).
368 See BEBCHUK ET AL., supra note 56, at 306.
369 See Sheehan, supra note 148, at 318.
370 That is to say, both within and outside the family firm context.
365
366
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personal business venture.371 Entrepreneurial passion is said
to be experienced “as a complex pattern of psychological, brain
and body responses activated and maintained by an entrepreneur’s passion that, when [self-]regulated, aid in motivating
coherent and coordinated goal pursuit.”372 Crucial to entrepreneurial passion in the above sense is the notion of self-identity,
which is claimed to provoke “intense positive feelings experienced
by engagement in entrepreneurial activities associated with
roles that are meaningful and salient to the self-identity of the
entrepreneur.”373
The notion of entrepreneurial passion has recently been
developed further by Lahti et al., who claim that “a venture
embodies the founding entrepreneur’s creations, ideas, goals,
unique knowledge, work, invested efforts, and life experiences,
all of which are expressive of and salient to the entrepreneur’s
representation of the self,” thereby engendering “a high degree of
motivation to act on behalf of the venture.”374 It follows from this
purported “sense of self”375 embodied in the entrepreneurial firm
that “the venture’s failure may severely reduce the entrepreneur’s
self-worth, causing the entrepreneur to suffer shame and embarrassment.”376 Vice versa, it has been observed how entrepreneurial passion brings powerful “nonmonetary [and especially
Melissa S. Cardon et al., A Tale of Passion: New Insights into Entrepreneurship From a Parenthood Metaphor, 20 J. BUS. VENTURING 23, 23–27 (2005)
[hereinafter A Tale of Passion]. Building (inter alia) on these insights, more
recent psychological research conducted by Lahti et al. has identified a comparable phenomenon which these authors term “entrepreneurial bonding”, denoting
“an entrepreneur’s profound connection with the venture” in a fundamentally
similar vein to parent-to-child bonding. Tom Lahti et al., Why and How do
Founding Entrepreneurs Bond with their Ventures? Neural Correlates of Entrepreneurial and Parental Bonding, 34 J. BUS. VENTURING 368, 368–69 (2019).
Lahti et al. claim that, “[b]y developing strong bonds with their ventures, founding
entrepreneurs become motivated to overcome environmental threats and challenges, putting themselves in a better position to improve venture creation outcomes, growth, and performance.” Id. at 369.
372 See Cardon et al., supra note 364, at 518.
373 Id. at 517.
374 See Lahti et al., supra note 371, at 371.
375 Id.
376 Id. at 372.
371
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emotional377] rewards” to offset lower monetary rewards from
self-conducted business, while also encouraging self-sacrifice and
delayed gratification on the entrepreneur’s part.378 At the same
time, an entrepreneur’s identification with, or attachment to,
their firm or venture can cause them to view that firm in effect as
an extension of themselves, especially in instances where the firm
(rather like a human offspring) inherits some of the founder’s personal character traits as reflected in its distinct organizational culture and norms.379
From the perspective of the issue at hand, one notable purported implication of such attachment is that engagement in entrepreneurial activities that are meaningful to self-identity is
principally simulated not “by the instrumental goal of wealth creation and ‘maximisation,’” but rather by “intrinsic motivation
stemming from the validation and affirmation of an entrepreneur’s conception of true self.”380 Curiously, it has been found that
in such circumstances “wealth seeking is relevant but not central
to the conception of the self.”381 Moreover, entrepreneurial passion, insofar as it is linked inextricably to self-identity, is said by
its nature to “endure over a longer period of time” as opposed to
being merely fleeting or episodic in nature.382 As such, it purportedly “has a motivational effect that stimulates entrepreneurs to
overcome obstacles and remain engaged.”383
However, whereas intrinsic motivations of the above type
are typically present on the part of first-generation (founder)
controllers, they tend not to be so prevalent within second-generation family firms controlled by a founder-entrepreneur’s descendant(s).384 The same can arguably be said for entrepreneurial
abilities, which are by no means certain to transmit through

See A Tale of Passion, supra note 371, at 37.
Id.
379 Id. at 38–39.
380 See Cardon et al., supra note 364, at 526.
381 Id.
382 Id.
383 Id. at 512.
384 See A Tale of Passion, supra note 371, at 24, 33.
377
378
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successive familial generations.385 Indeed, Perez-Gonzales has
found that firms where CEO successions run to family members
(related either by blood or marriage) exhibit systematically lower
profitability and weaker accounting performance than those
firms which promote non-familial employees to CEO level.386
Perez-Gonzales attributes this to the negative effect of nepotistic
(vis-à-vis meritocratic) promotions decisions in effectively buffering familial CEO appointees from prior disciplining and screening
by the external market for managerial talent.387 Likewise,
Bennedsen et al. have found that family firms which permit CEO
successions to other family members systematically underperform (in terms of firm profitability) in relation to those family
firms where professional non-family managers are appointed as
successor-CEOs to the founder.388
From a corporate perspective, moreover, it is questionable whether the acknowledged business and investor benefits of
having an autonomous entrepreneurial presence at the firstgeneration stage will persist throughout subsequent generations.389 Empirical studies have shown that, whereas “[in] first
generation family firms, the presence of the founder is the most
powerful influence on organisational development ... [t]his founder
centrality is reduced as the firm moves to the second generation.”390
At the second-generation stage, by contrast, “decision making
becomes less centralised and personalised” in search of “new
ways to revitalise and further expand the business.”391 It follows
that “second-generation CEOs need to develop a more external
385 Curiously, it has been recorded that two-thirds of family businesses typically fail to survive beyond the first-generation stage due to succession-related
difficulties. See Descovich et al., supra note 65, at 60 n.97.
386 Francisco Pérez-González, Inherited Control and Firm Performance, 96
AM. ECON. REV. 1559, 1559, 1585 (2006).
387 Id. at 1560–78, 1585.
388 See Bennedsen et al., supra note 157, at 649, 669, 689.
389 Id. at 653.
390 Cristina Cruz & Mattias Nordqvist, Entrepreneurial Orientation in Family
Firms: A Generational Perspective, 38 SMALL BUS. ECON. 33, 36 (2012) (citing
Stéphanie Brun de Ponet et al., An Exploration of the Generational Differences
in Levels of Control Held Among Family Businesses Approaching Succession,
20 FAM. BUS. REV. 337 (2007)).
391 Id.
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culture orientation [than founders] that places a greater value on
signals from the external environment” such as emerging market
trends and industry characteristics.392 Accordingly, in those latter instances, it would appear that the abovementioned disparity
between control and cash flow rights arising from a DCS structure, and the resultant insulation that this provides from external
capital market pressures, potentially represents a much more significant governance problem than in the case of first-generation
(founder) firms.
It is principally for the above reason that this Article, despite being otherwise supportive of a private ordering approach
towards DCS structures, would nonetheless caution against embracing an outright deregulatory stance with respect to the issue
of DCS sunset design. Indeed, whilst—in the present author’s
view—the above arguments against mandatory time-based sunsets
remain compelling, there nonetheless remains a reasonable case
for engendering the adoption of succession- or general transferbased sunset provisions over perpetual DCS structures, especially
in the family firm context.393
Accordingly, the present author would respectfully suggest
that the SEC and principal domestic exchanges give serious
consideration to adopting the transfer-centered model of sunset
regulation that has recently been implemented by the Hong Kong
and Singaporean exchanges, as a more moderate alternative to
the CII’s proposed time-based scheme.394 The advantage of the
former approach to sunset regulation is that, unlike the time-based
model, it preserves a firm’s contractual freedom over matters of
Id. Indeed, external environmental signals of this nature would appear
to be a pertinent factor in engendering “entrepreneurial alertness” in secondgeneration familial controllers, which the economist Israel Kirzner has defined
as the propensity to identify and respond to market disequilibria via so-called
“frame-breaking”: that is, identifying novel or contrarian strategies that entail
departing from existing organizational thought frameworks. ISRAEL M. KIRZNER,
PERCEPTION, OPPORTUNITY, AND PROFIT 148 (1979).; see also Connie Marie
Gaglio & Jerome A. Katz, The Psychological Basis of Opportunity Identification:
Entrepreneurial Alertness, 16 SMALL BUS. ECON. 95, 99–100, 104 (2001) (citing
ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, DISCOVERY AND THE CAPITALIST PROCESS 56 (1985)).
393 See Cruz & Nordqvist, supra note 390, at 33.
394 See Sharfman, supra note 4, at 3–4.
392
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DCS design insofar as its multi-vote shares (together with the
economic interest therein) remain in the possession of their
original holder.395 However, in contrast to the pure private ordering approach to sunset design, the transfer-centered model
insures against the risk of a business founder’s diverse motivations and capabilities failing to transmit to her familial or
other successors.396 Relatedly, the transfer-centered model
(unlike the pure private ordering approach to sunset design) is
sensitive to the unique strategic and governance challenges faced by
entrepreneurial firms on the death or retirement of their founder,
which give cause to question the utility of continually entrenching
second- and successive-generation controllers against outside
challenge.397
Accordingly, it is this Article’s contention that the case for
consolidating founder-familial control across generational lines
is insufficiently convincing to justify permitting DCS structures
in perpetuity. At the same time, though, the present author acknowledges the significant sensitivity and context-dependency
of the various market and behavioral factors at play in this area,
and the fact that the surrounding academic and policy debate on
DCS sunset design remains at a somewhat formative stage.
Against this background, there is arguably something to be said
for the suggestion that policymakers in the United States should
continue to put their trust in private ordering as a prospective
means of bringing about effective (self-) regulatory responses to
the above concerns, unless and until the case for affirmative
regulatory interventionism in this regard has been unequivocally
made out.398

Id. at 33–34.
A transfer-based sunset provision ordinarily achieves this outcome in practice
by preventing multiple-vote shares from passing prematurely to heirs or other
transferees without the prior authorization of non-controlling shareholders. See
Descovich et al., supra note 65, at 60.
397 See Sharfman, Sunsets, supra note 97, at 10.
398 In this regard, Sharfman envisages that “[i]f the market is concerned
about dual class share structures creating family dynasties, then it will at least
include an event-based sunset provision such as unification upon the death or
disability of the controller.” Id.
395
396
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CONCLUSION
The evolving debate on optimal DCS sunset design,399 like the
debate on the relative merits of dual- versus single-class stock more
generally,400 is unlikely to recede any time soon. It is reasonable
to expect that, over the coming years, further entrepreneurially
led e-commerce, social media and other tech-sector businesses
will turn to public equity markets as a source of vital growth finance.401 At the same time, the heightening specter of hedge
funds and other activist shareholders in corporate governance
will no doubt continue to provoke caution on the part of business
founders about surrendering their control rights to prospective
outside insurgents.402
As more and more companies and investor groups come to
battle with these thorny issues—not just in the United States but
globally—it is imperative that policymakers everywhere remain
alert to the potential need for appropriate responses. At the same
time, given the complexity and firm-specificity of many of the factors involved in the question of DCS sunset design, regulators must
resist the temptation to impose overly hasty or blunt “solutions”
to the perceived problems at hand. The inconvenient reality is
that, with such polar interests and ideologies at play, any responsive action (or inaction) in this regard will almost certainly alienate one constituency or another.
Against the above background, this Article has sought to
demonstrate that the transfer-centered sunset model recently implemented (in differing ways) by the Hong Kong and Singaporean
listing authorities is, all things considered, the presumptively
best—or, more accurately, least worst—of the principal available
models in terms of striking an effective balance between the two
core conflicting concerns at play.403 These are, on the one hand,
preserving scope for private ordering of DCS structures (or otherwise) at the individual firm level; while, on the other hand,
See Winden & Baker, supra note 24, at 8–9.
Id.
401 See Descovich et al., supra note 65, at 1, 33–34, 37; Goshen & Squire,
supra note 101, at 807.
402 Goshen & Squire, supra note 101, at 821.
403 See Descovich et al., supra note 65, at 50–51.
399
400
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protecting companies and non-controlling minority shareholders
from the most worrying potential misuses of those structures.404
While transfer-based sunsets are by no means immune from criticism themselves, it is the present author’s contention that they
are overall preferable to time-based sunsets in terms of moderating the above trade-off.405 This is especially so if recent proposals
to regulate the matter of DCS sunset design406 are to be given
serious consideration by policymakers.
For the foregoing reasons, it is therefore submitted that the
SEC and main domestic market authorities should continue to resist
calls from influential investor-related bodies for the introduction
of mandatory time-based sunsets. For constructive inspiration in
this regard, U.S. policymakers should look to Asia rather than at
home, taking the recent Hong Kong and Singaporean market reforms as illustrative examples of best practice.407 At the same
time, pending the development of a broader consensus on the merits of regulating the matter of DCS sunset design in general, there
is an arguable case for permitting private ordering to prevail in
this area for the immediate time being.408
As the mixed history of previous reactive securities law reforms has demonstrated,409 there is much truth in the age-old adage about fools rushing in where angels fear to tread. By the same
token, when it comes to regulatory responsiveness to salient policy concerns the early bird seldom catches the worm, or at least
the one they happened to be looking for at the time.

See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 12, at 607, 618.
See supra text accompanying notes 393–97.
406 See Winden & Baker, supra note 24, at 10–11.
407 See SGX Mainboard Rules, supra note 28, at 10; HK LISTING RULES,
supra note 274, at 8A-5, 8A-7; Descovich et al., supra note 65, at 50.
408 See Sharfman, Sunsets, supra note 97, at 2–3, 6, 8.
409 See Descovich et al., supra note 65, at 92.
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